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DAMAGES FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MONETARY CLAIMS
IN HOPWOOD V. TEXAS
Richard H. Seamon"
INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have focused on the constitutionality of govern-
ment affirmative action programs but have largely ignored an important reme-
dial question: When may a court award money to people injured by programs
that are unconstitutional?1 This Article explores that question by analyzing the
monetary claims in Hopwood v. Texas.2 Hopwood concerns the affirmative ac-
tion program used in the early 1990s for admission to the University of Texas
School of Law.3 This Article concludes that the monetary claims in Hopwood,
except for the claim for attorney's fees, are barred by sovereign and official im-
munity.
4
The ease of stating that conclusion belies the tortuous path necessary to
reach it. Indeed, one aim of this Article is to show how complicated and irra-
tional the principles governing sovereign and official immunity have become.
5
Those principles are far removed from the considerations that should govern
monetary relief for illegal government action.6 Ironically, the remoteness of the
immunity doctrines from the substantive contexts in which they apply "immu-
nizes" them from scrutiny by most of the legal profession. 7 By applying those
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University School of Law.
I previously served as an Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States. In that position, I
represented the United States in three cases cited or discussed in this article: Virginia Military Inst. v.
United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993), cited infra note 13; City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-67
(1992), cited infra note 251; and United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992), discussed infra
text accompanying notes 19 203. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone.
1. For extensive legal bibliographies on affirmative action, see ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER, THE
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 277-91 (1980);
KATHANNE W. GREENE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE 177-80 (1989);
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 322-37 (1996).
2. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
3. Although the judicial opinion in Hopwood that drew national attention was decided in March
1996, the case remains alive and may eventually be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
See Part I infra for a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Hopwood.
4. See infra Part III for a discussion of why the monetary claims, aside from those for attorney's
fees, are barred by sovereign and official immunity.
5. See infra Parts II and IV for a discussion of immunity principles applicable to Hopwood.
6. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the principles currently governing sovereign and official
immunity.
7. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
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doctrines to a case that has received national attention, I hope to involve a
broader segment of the profession in reexamining sovereign and official immu-
nity.
8
This Article pays particular attention to the principles developed by the Su-
preme Court for interpreting statutes that eliminate sovereign immunity. Those
principles warrant special attention because they appear to defeat certain statu-
tory claims for monetary damages in Hopwood despite strong evidence that
Congress intended to authorize such relief.9 The claims are those based on Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; a statute that Congress amended in 1986 spe-
cifically to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. 10 Although the lower fed-
eral courts have held that the 1986 Amendment exposes the states to liability in
monetary damages,11 this Article concludes otherwise, because the 1986
Amendment does not express with sufficient clarity that Congress intended to
hold states liable for monetary damages.' 2 In any event, the question whether a
state in a federal court action can be held liable for money damages under the
1986 Amendment warrants the Court's attention, and may well receive it in
Hopwood or another case in the near future.
13
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1983) (noting that few in legal profession are familiar with modem Elev-
enth Amendment law).
8. See David G. Savage, Court Lets Stand Ruling Against Race Preference, L.A. TIMEs, July 2,
1996, at Al (stating that Fifth Circuit decision in Hopwood has "gained national attention"); see also
Michael S. Greve, Hopwood and Its Consequences, 17 PACE L. REV. 1, 1 & n.1 (1996) (reporting that
Hopwood "sent shockwaves through the world of higher education" and citing published reaction);
Richard H. Seaton, Affirmative Action at the Crossroads, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 248, 248 (1997) (stating
that Hopwood "sent shock waves through the American academy").
9. See infra notes 161-256 and accompanying text for an analysis of claims in Hopwood that are
based on Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see infra notes 187, 216-20 & 252 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the text and purpose of the 1986 amendments to Title VI.
11. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal courts that have held
that the 1986 amendment to Title VI authorizes the imposition of monetary damages against states.
12. See infra notes 193-256 and accompanying text for the author's argument that the 1986
amendment was not sufficiently clear to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.
13. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), that denial
occurred when the case was in an interlocutory posture because the Fifth Circuit decision that the
Hopwood defendants asked the Supreme Court to review was remanded by the Fifth Circuit for fur-
ther proceedings in the district court. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1033 (1996). The Supreme Court "generally await[s] final judgment in the lower courts be-
fore exercising [its] certiorari jurisdiction." Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946 (1993)
(opinion of Scalia, J., respecting denial of certiorari); but cf Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 971-
76, 117 S. Ct. 1865, 1868 (1997) (per curiam) (reviewing appellate decision at interlocutory stage). The
district court has now entered a final judgment against the Hopwood defendants, who have since ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 923-24 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (enter-
ing final judgment); Rex Bossert, Texas AG Abandons 'Hopwood' But Case May Get Back to Supreme
Court on Appeal, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1998, at A10 (noting that plaintiffs have appealed from final
judgment denying monetary claims). The Supreme Court could grant certiorari to review the Fifth
Circuit's decision on the pending appeal from the final judgment. One reason for granting certiorari
would be to resolve the question whether states can be held liable in monetary damages in federal
court under Title VI. As discussed infra, that is an important issue, because the statute that may make
[Vol. 71
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Part I of this Article briefly describes the facts and procedural history of
Hopwood. Part II explains the principles of sovereign and official immunity
governing monetary claims in federal-court actions against state and local gov-
ernments and their officials. Part III applies those principles to the monetary
claims in Hopwood, with extended analysis of the Title VI claims. Finally, Part
IV identifies the arbitrary features of the immunity doctrines that become mani-
fest when they are applied in Hopwood.
14
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF HoPwoOD
Hopwood concerns the admission program in use during the early 1990s at
the University of Texas School of Law ("Law School"). 15 The program, as de-
scribed by the Fifth Circuit in words suggestive of its fate in that court, "granted
preferential treatment in admissions" to "blacks and Mexican Americans."
16
The program was challenged in a federal court action filed by four white resi-
dents of Texas who applied for, but were denied, admission to the Law School in
1992.17
The Hopwood plaintiffs sued several defendants, under a variety of legal
provisions, for various types of relief. They named as defendants the State of
Texas; the University of Texas Board of Regents ("Board"); the nine members
of the Board in their official capacity; the University of Texas at Austin ("Uni-
versity"); the President of the University; the Law School; the Dean of the Law
School in his official capacity; and the Chairman of the Law School's Admission
States liable in money damages applies not only to actions based on Title VI, but also to those based
on three other important federal anti-discrimination statutes: the Age Discrimination Act of 1965, Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See
infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of these anti-discrimination statutes.
14. This Article does not discuss the immunity principles applicable to the federal government
and its officials. For a discussion of these principles, see Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the Dis-
cretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 699-700
nn.17 & 19 (1997) (discussing federal government's sovereign immunity from tort claims); Richard H.
Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal
Government for Specific Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 159-79 (1998) (discussing federal gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity from contract claims). Nor does this Article discuss immunity princi-
ples applicable to state court actions against the states. For a discussion of these principles, see Rich-
ard H. Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts, 1 (forthcoming Apr. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Brandeis Law Journal) (discussing immunity of states from
lawsuits in their own courts); Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Dam-
ages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189, 234-35
(1981) (same).
15. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 582 n.87 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that challenged
admission program was used in 1992, 1993, and 1994), rev'd and remanded in part, and appeal dis-
missed in part, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
16. 78 F.3d at 936 n.4. An analysis of the Fifth Circuit's holding on the constitutionality of the
Law School's program is beyond the scope of this article. For commentary on that holding, see, e.g.,
David J. Jannuzzi, Comment, Hopwood, Equal Protection, and Affirmative Action: Can Anyone's Ox
Be Gored?, 14 ToURO L. REV. 549 (1998); Robert A. Lauer, Hopwood v. Texas: A Victory for
"Equality" That Denies Reality, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 109 (1996); see also supra note 8 (citing additional
commentary on Hopwood).
17. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
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Committee in his official capacity. 18 The plaintiffs claimed that the program
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and three
federal statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Title VI of the Civil
Right Act of 1964.19 They sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.2° In later proceedings, they also sought an
award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.21
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things,
that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 22 The district court de-
nied the motion in an unpublished order, and the case proceeded to a bench
trial.
23
After the trial, the district court held that the Law School's admission pro-
gram violated the Equal Protection Clause, but that only limited relief was war-
ranted for the violation. 24 The court declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to
18. Id. at 938 n.13; see also infra notes 56-61, 97-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
significance of the fact that individual defendants were sued in their "official" capacities.
19. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553. The Equal Protection Clause provides, "No State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Amendment's central command is an injunction against intentional racial discrimination by a
state or someone acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)
(describing prohibition of governmentally imposed racial discrimination as "core purpose" of Four-
teenth Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that proof of dis-
criminatory intent necessary to establish violation of Equal Protection Clause). Section 1983 creates a
cause of action for violations of the Constitution by persons acting under color of state law. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (noting that purpose of Section
1983 is to deter state actors from violating federally guaranteed rights). Section 1981 guarantees each
person "the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, ... as is enjoyed by white citizens" and pro-
tects that right "against ... impairment under color of State law." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), (c) (1994).
Thus, for example, Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination by state schools in their admission pro-
cess (i.e., in the terms under which they contract to provide education). See Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (describing schools' exclusion of students because of their race as "classic viola-
tion" of Section 1981). Finally, Title VI provides, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VI thus bars a state school that receives federal money from intentionally
discriminating in admission on the grounds of race. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 277-78, 281 (1978) (addressing racial discrimination claim against state medical school
based on Title VI).
20. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
21. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 911 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (stating that plaintiffs sought one-
and-a-half million dollars in fees for more than 7,200 attorney hours). 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) per-
mits courts to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to parties who prevail in actions to enforce, among
other provisions, Sections 1981 and 1983, and Title VI.
22. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), No. 95-1773, at
3 [hereinafter Hopwood cert. petition] (describing procedural history of case). The Eleventh
Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
23. See Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 3.
24. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 584-85. The district court analyzed the program only under the
Equal Protection Clause, observing that "[t]he plaintiffs' Title VI, § 1981, and § 1983 claims serve as
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apply for admission to the Law School for the 1995-1996 school year without
paying any application fees, and it ordered the Law School to consider their ap-
plications "along with all other applications for that school year. '25 The court
did not order the Law School to admit the plaintiffs automatically because they
had not proven that they would have been admitted under a constitutional ad-
mission program.26 For the same reason, the court declined to award any money
damages other than one dollar in nominal damages to each plaintiff.
27
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's equal protection ruling,28 but
largely rejected the district court's rulings on remedies.29 In its most significant
ruling on remedial issues, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in re-
quiring the plaintiffs to prove that they would have been admitted under a con-
vehicles to enforce underlying rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 553 n.2; see
also supra note 19 for a description of these provisions.
25. Id. at 585. The court determined that the admission program used for the school year 1995-
1996 "appear[ed] to remedy the defects the Court has found in the 1992 procedure." Id. at 582.
26. Id. at 579-83.
27. Id. at 582-83.
28. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996). Like the district court, the Fifth Circuit
focused on the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, finding their statutory claims to be merely "deriva-
tive" of the equal protection claim. Id. Also like the district court, the Fifth Circuit applied "strict
scrutiny" in analyzing the equal protection claim. Compare 861 F. Supp. at 569 with 78 F.3d at 940-41.
A government program can survive such scrutiny only if it serves "compelling" government interests
in a "narrowly tailored" way. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding, in review of federal government's race-conscious program for subcontracting, that "all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny[, which means that] such classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests"); cf Regents of
the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.) (stating, in review of affirmative
action program for higher education, that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination"). Although both courts in Hopwood
held that the Law School's admission program failed strict scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit based that hold-
ing on a much broader rationale than did the district court. The district court held that the program
served two government interests that were "compelling": those of ensuring a diverse student body and
remedying past unconstitutional discrimination in the Texas public education system. 861 F. Supp. at
569-73. The district court invalidated the program, however, on the ground that it was not "narrowly
tailored" to further those interests, because, in the district court's view, it did not require the Law
School's admissions committee to compare "minority" applicants to "nonminority" applicants. Id. at
578-79. That holding reflected a relatively minor defect in the program that was easily cured. Id. at
582 & n.87 (determining that, on its face, admission program used in 1995 cured the constitutional de-
fect identified by the court). In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether the
admission program was "narrowly tailored," because in its view the program did not serve any "com-
pelling" government interest. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government's
interest in achieving a diverse student body is not "compelling"; that only past unconstitutional dis-
crimination by the Law School itself (as distinguished from the university system) could justify the
program; and that the Law School had not proven such past discrimination. Id. at 941-55. Those
holdings make it difficult for any state school to devise a race-conscious affirmative action program for
admissions. See Greve, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that Hopwood decision will force public colleges and
universities in Fifth Circuit "to dismantle overtly race-conscious admissions programs"); Seaton, supra
note 8, at 253 (stating that Hopwood decision would "put in jeopardy a large percentage of the admis-
sion plans used in limited-enrollment state institutions").
29. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
1998]
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stitutional admission program; instead, the appellate court held, the defendants
bore the burden of proving that the plaintiffs would not have been admitted un-
der a constitutional program. 30 The Fifth Circuit added that the defendants'
failure to meet that burden on remand would "open[] a panoply of potential re-
lief," including money damages, 31 and it directed the district court on remand "to
reconsider the question of damages." 32 The Fifth Circuit, however, did not ad-
dress whether damages would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because
the defendants had not raised that issue on appeal.
33
The Hopwood defendants unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review of
the Fifth Circuit's decision in a petition for a writ of certiorari prepared by Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe. 34 In his petition, Professor Tribe briefly revived the elev-
enth amendment argument that the defendants had made in the district court but
had not pressed on appeal. 35 The focus of his attack, however, was on the Fifth
Circuit's equal protection analysis.36 While attacking that analysis, Professor
Tribe did not defend the constitutionality of the program under which the plain-
tiffs had been denied admission to the Law School in 1992. Presumably he failed
to do so because, after 1992, the defendants significantly revised the admission
program.37 In any event, the defendants' revision of the program and their fail-
ure in the petition for certiorari to defend the version under which the plaintiffs
had been denied admission probably explain the Court's denial of certiorari. As
two Justices observed in an opinion accompanying the denial of certiorari, there
was no longer a genuine controversy about the constitutionality of the program
that led to the lawsuit.
38
On remand, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for approxi-
mately two-and-one half million dollars in compensatory damages and allowed
them less than half of the one-and-one-half million dollars in attorney's fees that
they sought.39 In the court's view, the defendants had proven that the plaintiffs
would not have been admitted under a constitutional admission program.
40
30. Id. at 955-57.
31. Id. at 957.
32. Id. at 962.
33. Id. at 957 n.56 (stating: "[w]e do not opine on any Eleventh Amendment immunity in this
case. This issue is simply not before us.") (citation omitted). For a possible explanation of why the
defendants did not raise the Eleventh Amendment issue on appeal, see infra note 44.
34. See Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22 (reverse side of cover).
35. Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 22-24.
36. Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 12-21.
37. See Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 582 & n.87 (discussing changes in admission program made for
selecting the entering class of 1995, and holding that those changes appeared to cure constitutional
defect).
38. See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1034 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. joined by Souter, J.) (re-
specting the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari) (stating that "we must await a final judgment
on a program genuinely in controversy before addressing the important question raised in this peti-
tion").
39. See Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 902-04, 908-11 (setting forth each plaintiff's dam-
ages claim and total request for attorney's fees).
40. Id. at 884.
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Thus, they had suffered no actual damages.
41
Both sides in Hopwood have again appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The plain-
tiffs have appealed the district court's decision on their claims for money dam-
ages and attorney's fees.42 The defendants have cross-appealed from the portion
of the district court's judgment that enjoins them from considering race in admis-
sions.
43
II. THE IMMUNITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR OFFICIALS
The failure of the Hopwood defendants to press their eleventh amendment
claim on appeal to the Fifth Circuit is somewhat surprising in light of Supreme
Court decisions construing the Amendment to give the states broad sovereign
immunity from federal-court actions. 44 More understandable is the failure of the
Hopwood plaintiffs to seek to hold the individual defendants personally liable in
damages. The recovery of money damages out of these officials' own pockets
41. Id. at 923 (awarding each plaintiff nominal damages of only one dollar).
42. See Bossert, supra note 13, at A1O (noting that plaintiffs have appealed from final judgment
denying monetary claims).
43. See Janet Elliott, Switch in Tactics in Hopwood Appeal, NATL L.J., June 8, 1998, at A6 (not-
ing that defendants have appealed injunction prohibiting consideration of race in admissions). On the
cross-appeal by the Hopwood defendants, the Fifth Circuit may well rely on the "law of the case" doc-
trine to decline to review the portion of the final judgment that bars the defendants from considering
race in admissions, because the Fifth Circuit considered this matter in its initial decision. Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 958. "The law of the case doctrine generally precludes the reexamination of issues decided on
appeal, either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court itself on subsequent appeal."
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Houston Bldg. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 860, 864 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) (cita-
tion omitted). Nonetheless, the defendants had to file a cross-appeal in order to enable the Supreme
Court to review that portion of the judgment. See United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453,
461 n.12 (1983) (observing that government's failure to cross appeal prevented it from obtaining Su-
preme Court review of district court determination underlying portions of judgment adverse to gov-
ernment). Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court would not be precluded by the "law of the
case" doctrine from reviewing that aspect of the judgment; in particular, its prior denial of certiorari
would not preclude such review. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363,
365-66 n.1 (1973) (holding that prior denial of certiorari did not bar Court's review of issue addressed
in lower court decision as to which certiorari was previously denied).
44. See infra notes 46-82 and accompanying text (Part II.A) for a discussion of states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity defense. The defendants may have concluded that they did not have
a plausible Eleventh Amendment defense because such a defense seemed to be so plainly eliminated
by Title VI. See infra notes 161-256 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title VI claims. By the
same token, Professor Tribe may have decided to revive the eleventh amendment argument because
of a Supreme Court decision, issued ten days after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood, that cast
doubt on Congress's power in Title VI to abrogate the States' eleventh amendment immunity. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (stating that Eleventh Amendment prohibits Con-
gress from making state capable of being sued in federal court; decided Mar. 27, 1996); Hopwood, 78
F.3d at 932 (decided Mar. 18, 1996); see also Robert Elder, Jr., State Immunity Rears Its Head, TEX.
LAW., Aug. 12, 1996, at 1 (noting that Seminole Tribe made sovereign immunity "live issue"). As dis-
cussed in greater detail infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text, Seminole Tribe held that Congress
cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 72-73. Because Title VI has been regarded as a statute enacted under the Spending Clause




was barred by yet another immunity doctrine: that of official immunity. 45 This
Part discusses the principles of sovereign and official immunity applicable in the
Hopwood case and elucidates their irrational features.
A. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
The states, as well as their agencies and their officials (when sued in their
official capacity), generally enjoy sovereign immunity from private actions
brought in federal court.46 The Supreme Court has described this immunity as
conferred by the Eleventh Amendment. 47 Nonetheless, to understand the
breadth of the immunity, one must largely ignore the text of the Amendment it-
self.48 One must also bear in mind three exceptions to that immunity, that, like
its otherwise broad scope, cannot be gleaned from the Eleventh Amendment's
text.
By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment limits the power of federal courts to
decide just two kinds of cases. It states, "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
45. See infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text (Part II.B) for a discussion of state officials'
immunity from money damages under the doctrine of official immunity.
46. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (describing Eleventh Amendment as confirming that
"federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting states 'was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States"' (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890))). Although the Eleventh Amendment immunizes States from actions filed in a lower federal
court, it does not immunize them from actions filed in state court, or from appellate review by the
United States Supreme Court of state-court decisions in the latter actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)
(1994) (authorizing Supreme Court to review certain decisions by state courts raising federal issues);
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26-31 (1990) (holding
that Eleventh Amendment did not bar review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decision of state court in
action seeking monetary relief from state agencies). Nor does the Eleventh Amendment bar original
actions in the Supreme Court between the states. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907)
(holding that Court could exercise original jurisdiction over suit between states); see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (giving Supreme Court original jurisdiction of cases "in which a State shall be a
Party"); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328 (1934) (explaining that Court's exercise of original
jurisdiction over suits between States "was essential to the peace of the Union"); see generally
RICHARD H. FALLON, ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1047 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing history of Eleventh Amendment) [hereinafter "HART &
WESCHLER"]. Finally, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions that are brought against a State
by the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (rejecting
State's argument that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers in authorizing State as defendant);
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-45 (1892) (stating that Constitution grants federal courts ju-
risdiction in cases brought by federal government against states).
47. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) (stating that Eleventh Amendment "is rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union,
maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity").
48. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (stating "The Court's recognition
of sovereign immunity has not been limited to the suits described in the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (stating: "'we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms"' (quoting Blatch-
ford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,779 (1991))).
[Vol. 71
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State. '49 Thus, the Eleventh Amendment
bars federal-court actions brought against a state by: (1) a citizen of another
state; or (2) an alien.
The Supreme Court has construed the Eleventh Amendment much more
broadly than that, on the ground that the Amendment reflects, without exhaus-
tively defining, an immunity implicit in the Constitution as a whole.50 As con-
strued, the Eleventh Amendment bars not only an action against a State that is
brought by the citizen of another state but also one that is brought by the State's
own citizen.51 It bars not only an action brought by an alien, but also one
brought by a foreign country.52 The Amendment bars not only actions in law or
equity but also those in admiralty concerning property in possession of the
state.53 Finally, the Eleventh Amendment bars not only actions that name a
state as the defendant but also actions that are nominally against other parties,
such as a state official, if the State is the "real party in interest.
'54
The "real party in interest" feature of eleventh amendment immunity needs
some elaboration, for it plays a key role in analyzing the claims in Hopwood. It
means, for one thing, that the Eleventh Amendment prevents actions against any
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
50. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[Wle cannot ... assume that the
letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States.
Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control"); Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (stating "[t]hat a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence ... of which the [Eleventh] Amendment is but an exemplification");
see also Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279,292 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (stating that "despite the narrowness of
the language of the [Eleventh] Amendment, its spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting
the reach of the federal judicial power generally," so as to foreclose suits beyond those described in its
text).
51. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-21 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
barred federal-court suit by Louisiana citizen against Louisiana).
52. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 332-33 (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred federal-court suit
against State by a foreign country).
53. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 497-98 (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars admi-
ralty suits against States); cf. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1464, 1470-73 (1998)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment does not bar admiralty suit where court's in rem jurisdiction based
on property that, though claimed by State, is not within State's possession).
54. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (stating that Eleventh
Amendment applies "'when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state,"'
because in such case "'the state is the real, substantial party in interest"') (quoting Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945))); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment barred suit against state officer for injunctive relief that, in effect,
constituted specific performance of State's contract, because State was "the real party to the contro-
versy"); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) (stating, "[i]t is well established that the
[Eleventh] Amendment bars suits not only against the State when it is the named party but also when
it is the party in fact."); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 173 (1909) (holding that federal
court actions for injunction against members of state liquor dispensary "were suits against the state of
South Carolina, and within the inhibition of the Eleventh Amendment"); North Carolina v. Temple,
134 U.S. 22, 30 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred action against state auditor that
"was virtually a suit against the State").
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agency that is considered an "arm of the State," such as a state department of
treasury. 55 In addition, with the exception discussed in the next paragraph, the
Amendment bars an action against a state official, if the action is brought against
the official in his or her "official capacity. '56 In an official-capacity suit, the
plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief against the official's office 57-relief
that may bind not only the named official but also his or her successors in of-
fice 5 8-- or seeks monetary relief that is to be paid, not out of the official's own
pocket, but rather out of the state treasury.59 Distinct from an official-capacity
suit is one brought against an official in his or her "individual," or "personal,"
capacity. 6° In a personal-capacity suit, the plaintiff seeks to hold the official per-
sonally liable, usually for money damages.
61
Thus, the Eleventh Amendment generally bars private, federal-court ac-
tions against the State, an arm of the State, or a state official in his or her official
capacity. There are, however, three important exceptions to that bar.
One exception, which has been traced to the Court's decision in Ex parte
Young,62 permits federal-court actions against state officials for prospective re-
lief from violations of federal law. 63 Most significantly, plaintiffs can use the Ex
55. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 460-64 (1945) (Eleventh
Amendment barred action against state department of treasury and officials constituting its board for
money out of state treasury); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment barred action against state police department); Mount Healthy
City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (noting that Eleventh Amendment bars actions
against agencies that function as "arms" of State); cf. Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S.
194, 199 (1929) (holding that state highway commission was not "citizen" for purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction because it "was but the arm or alter ego of the State with no funds or ability to respond in
damages").
56. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (stating official-capacity suits "gener-
ally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,"
and therefore that "an official-capacity suit is... to be treated as a suit against the entity").
57. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (official capacity suit "is a suit against the official's office").
58. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 25(d) (providing for automatic substitution of successors to officials who
are sued in their official capacity and leave office while case is pending); FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(1)
(same); S. CT. R. 35.3-4 (same); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,470 & n.18 (1985) (noting that
in federal-court action against official in his official capacity that successor in office was automatically
substituted as defendant while case pending on appeal). But see Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514,
520-23 (1974) (vacating lower court decision granting injunctive relief against official and remanding
because of absence of evidence that original defendant's successor in office continued unconstitutional
practices of predecessor).
59. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 & n.l (stating that in official capacity suit for damages, plaintiff
"must look to the government entity itself"); see also Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471-72 (stating explicitly
that "judgment against a public servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he
represents" as long as entity receives notice and opportunity to respond to suit).
60. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 n.10 (observing that "[plersonal-capacity actions are sometimes
referred to as individual-capacity actions").
61. See id. at 166 (stating that "award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can
be executed only against the official's personal assets").
62. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
63. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997) (referring to doctrine of Ex
parte Young as "exception" to general rule of immunity for states and holding that federal-court suit
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parte Young exception to get declaratory and injunctive relief from unconstitu-
tional state laws.64 The Court has explained that, when an official administers an
unconstitutional state law, he or she is "stripped" of official authority and there-
fore cannot claim the immunity of the sovereign for which he or she acts.
65 It
bears emphasis, given the focus of this article, that Ex parte Young authorizes
only prospective relief; it "does not apply where a plaintiff seeks [money] dam-
ages from the public treasury."
66
Second, Congress may abrogate (i.e., override) eleventh amendment immu-
nity. Congress can do so, however, only in the exercise of certain constitutional
grants of power and only when it makes clear its intention to do so in the text of
a statute.67 Whether a constitutional grant of congressional power encompasses
the power to abrogate seems to depend on whether the grant predates or post-
dates the Eleventh Amendment. The Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that
Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in the exercise of its power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 More recently, however, the
Court held in Seminole Tribe v. Florida that Congress cannot abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment in the exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause. 69 To
reconcile the latter holding with Fitzpatrick, the Court in Seminole Tribe ex-
plained that the Fourteenth Amendment came after the Eleventh Amendment
for prospective relief by Indian tribe against state officials concerning ownership to certain lands did
not fall within exception); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 167-76 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (tracing history of "[t]he doctrine we call Ex parte Young"); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985) (discussing applicability of Ex pane Young); Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1041 & n.25 (ex-
plaining that Eleventh Amendment exception "commonly traced" to Ex pane Young "was in fact
firmly established" in earlier Court decisions); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 6 (describing Ex pane Young as the "most celebrated ex-
ample" of federal courts' power to enjoin federal-law violations by state officials).
64. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (observing that under Ex parte Young, "an
unconstitutional state enactment is void and ... any action by a state official that is purportedly
authorized by that enactment cannot be taken in an official capacity since the state authorization for
such action is a nullity"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979) (stating that under Ex parte Young
federal courts "may enjoin state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of fed-
eral law").
65. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60 (reasoning that when state official "comes into
conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution ... he is... stripped of his official or repre-
sentative character"); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885) (holding that defendant who
violated plaintiffs rights was stripped of his authority); see also Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 272-
73 (observing that, under nineteenth-century case law, which focused on whether official had acted
tortiously, "a state official who committed a common-law tort was said to have been 'stripped' of his
official or representative character").
66. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-78 (1974)
(holding that relief in officer suit that would require payment out of state treasury did not fall within
Ex parte Young exception).
67. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (holding that Title VII abrogated State's
eleventh amendment immunity from actions for employment discrimination).
68. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
69. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-73 (1996); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(Commerce Clause) (giving Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
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and was intended to alter the preexisting relationship between the states and the
federal government.70 That explanation appears to preclude Congress from re-
lying on any of the powers in Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.
71
Moreover, even when Congress uses an appropriate power, Congress can abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment only when it makes its intention to do so "in un-
mistakable language in the statute itself" that effects the abrogation.
72
70. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66. The Court in Seminole Tribe determined that the
holding in Fitzpatrick did not support Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment in exercise
of Commerce Clause, because
Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Elev-
enth Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing
balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amend-
ment.
71. See, e.g., In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating, "The Seminole
Tribe Court held that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity by legislation passed pur-
suant to its Article I powers."); Meltzer, supra note 63, at 2 (characterizing Seminole Tribe as holding
"Congress lacks constitutional power, when acting under Article I, to directly overcome a state's im-
munity from suit in federal court"); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?,
106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1691 (1997) (describing Seminole Tribe as holding that "Eleventh Amendment
immunity cannot be abrogated by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers"); cf. Henry Paul Mona-
ghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 102 (1996) (describing Seminole
Tribe as holding, more narrowly, that "Congress lacks authority under its Article I, Section 8 regula-
tory powers to abrogate") (emphasis added). But see Diaz-Gandia v. Depena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609,
616 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that, notwithstanding Seminole Tribe, Congress had power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment pursuant to War Powers under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution).
72. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985); see also Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment is required "[blecause abrogation.., upsets the fundamental constitutional
balance between the Federal Government and the States... and because States are unable directly to
remedy a judicial misapprehension of that abrogation.") (internal quotations omitted). In Hutto v.
Finney, the Court suggested that, when exercising its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress did not need to satisfy the "clear statement" rule in order to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 698 n.31 (1979) (in rejecting argument that
42 U.S.C. § 1988 did not expressly abrogate state's eleventh amendment immunity from attorney's
fees, Court said "clear statement" rule applicable to federal statutes enacted under Article I is not
"appropriate" for federal statutes enacted under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); see also Maher
v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 131 & n.14 (1980) (reiterating Hutto Court's suggestion with apparent ap-
proval). According to Professor Chemerinsky, the suggestion in Hutto that the clear statement rule
does not apply to statutes enacted under Section 5 finds support in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274
(1989). Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment
on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 329-30 (1989). With respect, the
author disagrees with that reading of Jenkins. The Court in Jenkins emphasized that the monetary
relief awarded against the State in Hutto (an award of attorney's fees) did not implicate the Eleventh
Amendment at all, because it was ancillary to prospective relief. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 280 (stating,
"The holding of Hutto, therefore, was not just that Congress had spoken sufficiently clearly to over-
come Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting § 1988, but rather that the Eleventh Amendment
did not apply to an award of attorney's fees ancillary to a grant of prospective relief") By emphasizing
that the award did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment at all, the Court in Jenkins backed away
from its earlier suggestion that the statute under which the award was made abrogated the Eleventh
Amendment. Moreover, Hutto's suggestion cannot be squared with the Court's stringent application
of the clear statement rule in Atascadero to a statute that, the Court recognized, was enacted under
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The third restriction on the scope of eleventh amendment immunity is that
a state can consent to a federal-court action, or can, in other words, "waive" its
immunity.73 The waiver need not be purely altruistic to be effective. Instead, a
valid waiver can occur in response to pressure from Congress.74 One form of
pressure that is clearly permissible stems from Congress's power under the
Spending Clause.75 This Clause grants Congress authority to give states money
for activities such as administering public benefits programs.76 Congress could
condition a state's receipt of federal money for such a program on the state's
consent to sue in federal court for improper administration of the program. 77 In
addition to using financial incentives to obtain a waiver, Congress may be able to
use the threat of preemption as a lever for obtaining a state's waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity. Under this approach, Congress would enact a law that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 & 244-45 n.4; see also Welch
v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 n.2 (1987) (plurality opinion) (noting
that Atascadero Court applied clear statement rule to federal statute enacted under Section 5 of Four-
teenth Amendment); cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1989) (holding that clear
statement rule was satisfied by Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986); id. at 29-30
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with majority that statute at issue
"leaves no fair doubt that States are liable to private persons for money damages"), overruled in part
by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 (overruling holding in Union Gas that Congress could abrogate
Eleventh Amendment using Commerce Clause powers).
73. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that waiver was effected "by the
voluntary appearance of the State in intervening as a claimant of the fund in court"); cf. Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (distinguishing issue of Congress's power to abrogate eleventh amendment im-
munity from "the unremarkable, and completely unrelated, proposition that the States may waive
their sovereign immunity").
74. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992) (establishing that Congress can
use financial incentives or threats of federal preemption to encourage states to regulate in accordance
with federal prescriptions).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Spending Clause); see Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 1304, 1311-16 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that, even after Seminole Tribe, Congress may use
Spending Clause to encourage states to waive their eleventh amendment immunity as condition of
receiving federal funds); see also Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247 (holding that Rehabilitation Act "falls...
short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on
a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity"); see generally Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver
After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793, 807-21 (1998) (discussing continued vitality of notion that
States can "impliedly waive" Eleventh Amendment).
76. See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 511 n.10 (1990) (noting that, in 1988,
federal government contributed approximately twenty-nine billion dollars to Medicaid program).
77. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that State waived
eleventh amendment immunity from monetary claims based on Title VI by accepting federal funds in
the face of Congress's clear intention to authorize suits for violation of Title VI by recipients of funds);
see also Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1311-16 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that,
even after Seminole Tribe, Congress may use Spending Clause to encourage states to waive their elev-
enth amendment immunity as condition of receiving federal funds); cf. Magnolia Venture Capital
Corp. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 442-46 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that state agency lacked
authority to waive state's eleventh amendment immunity from claim asserted in federal bankruptcy
proceeding); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (stating: "Where the recipient of
federal funds is a State, as is not unusual today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may
influence a State's legislative choices").
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provided for federal regulation of a subject unless a state consented to waive its
immunity from federal-court lawsuits related to the state's continued regulation
of the subject.78 This approach to obtaining a waiver, however, may no longer be
valid after Seminole Tribe.79 In any event, whether Congress uses the Spending
Clause or the threat of preemption, Congress must make the waiver condition
unmistakably clear on the face of a federal statute.80 Otherwise, a state's receipt
of funds or continued regulation will not effectively waive its immunity.8 1 A
78. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (stating that, "where Congress has
the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress'
power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having
state law pre-empted by federal regulation").
79. Seminole Tribe held that Congress could not use the Commerce Clause--or, apparently, its
other Article I powers-to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 54-73. That holding would have little significance if Congress could condition a State's contin-
ued regulation of a field that Congress could regulate under Article I upon the state's waiver of elev-
enth amendment immunity. As Justice Scalia explained in the case that Seminole Tribe overruled:
[T]o acknowledge that the Federal Government can make the waiver of state sovereign im-
munity a condition to the State's action in a field that Congress has authority to regulate is
substantially the same as acknowledging that the Federal Government can eliminate state
sovereign immunity in the exercise of its Article I powers-that is, to adopt the very princi-
ple [that] . .. [Seminole Tribe] rejected.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 44 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on same passage of Scalia's
dissenting opinion to reject argument that State waived its eleventh amendment immunity from pri-
vate, federal-court actions for copyright infringement and violation of Lanham Act); Close v. New
York, 125 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir. 1997) (relying on Justice Scalia's dissent in Union Gas to reject argu-
ment that State of New York waived its eleventh amendment immunity from private, federal-court
actions under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, an Article I statute); College Sav. Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 362-66 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
State did not constructively waive eleventh amendment immunity from action under Lanham Act),
petition for cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149); see also John T. Cross, In-
tellectual Property & the Eleventh Amendment after Seminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 533-38
(1998) (arguing that constructive waiver of eleventh amendment immunity is no longer viable theory).
But cf. Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998) petition
for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 3, 1998) (No. 98-731) (finding University impliedly waived
its eleventh amendment immunity from federal-court declaratory judgment action concerning Univer-
sity patent); Kinports, supra note 75, at 810 n.77 (citing other post-Seminole cases addressing contin-
ued vitality of implied-waiver doctrine).
80. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (stating, "In deciding whether a State has
waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find a waiver only where
stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave
no room for any other reasonable construction") (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets supplied
by the Court); see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987)
(overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 194 (1964) "to the extent that [it] is inconsistent with the
requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in
unmistakably clear language"); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280
n.1 & 282 (1973) (reading Parden "in the final analysis" as turning on implied-waiver rationale);
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (reasoning that, by operating railroad, state impliedly
waived eleventh amendment immunity from suit under federal statute by injured railroad employee
and the federal statute abrogated eleventh amendment immunity).
81. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (stating, "[t]he mere fact that a State partici-
pates in a program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by
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waiver of the Eleventh Amendment, like an abrogation, must be unmistakably
clear to be effective.
82
B. Official Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court jurisdiction when a
plaintiff seeks to hold a state official personally liable for money damages-i.e.,
an individual-capacity suit.83 Many such suits are barred, however, by the doc-
trine of official immunity. 84 Unlike sovereign immunity, the official immunity
doctrine is not rooted in the Constitution. 85 Rather, official immunity rests on
common law doctrines that have been read to restrict statutes and other legal
doctrines that would otherwise permit actions for money damages against offi-
cials.86 Officials can invoke this immunity when sued for discretionary conduct
within the scope of their official duties.
8 7
the State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be
sued in the federal courts."); see also Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nurs-
ing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam) (holding that State did not consent to private
action in federal court for recovery of money due under Medicaid program); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl.
Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that State did not waive its
eleventh amendment immunity from federal-court suit under Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal
funds). But see Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that State
waived eleventh amendment immunity from monetary claims based on Title VI by accepting federal
funds in the face of Congress's clear intention to authorize suits for violation of Title VI by recipients
of funds).
82. See George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 385 (1985) (stating that, under Atascadero, "the degree of clarity needed
in a federal spending power statute to find a waiver by the state of its eleventh amendment protection
is precisely the same as that needed to find intent on the part of Congress to abrogate that protection
in the context of the fourteenth amendment"). But cf Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118
S. Ct. 2047, 2054-57 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing State should be deemed to waive its
immunity when it removes action to federal court brought against it in state court).
83. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 & n.l (1985) (noting that Eleventh Amendment
does not apply when state official is liable for damages in his individual capacity).
84. HART & WESCHLER, supra note 46, at 1155-84; see Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against
Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1119-33 (1981) (discussing official immunity for public offi-
cials).
85. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 403-05
(1979) (basing absolute official immunity of state legislators on interpretation of federal statutes in
light of common law). Unlike most officials, whose immunity apparently does not stem from the Con-
stitution, federal legislators enjoy immunity under the Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6,
cl. 1 (Speech or Debate Clause).
86. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 229-36 (1991) (applying doctrine of qualified immunity in
action against federal official for damages caused by official's constitutional violation); Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (stating that courts, in determining whether official has qualified im-
munity from claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ask whether officials had such immunity when Section 1983
was enacted and also interpret history and purpose of Section 1983); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.
360, 372 n.10 (1980) (referring to official immunity as creation of federal common law); see also HART
& WESCHLER, supra note 46, at 1167 (discussing nature of qualified immunity).
87. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (stating that official immu-
nity protects discretionary conduct carried out within scope of official duties); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
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Some officials enjoy "absolute" official immunity: they cannot be sued for
any official conduct, no matter how outrageous and malicious. 88 The Constitu-
tion itself confers such absolute protection on federal legislators for conduct re-
lated to their legislative duties. 89 In addition, the United States Supreme Court
has accorded absolute official immunity to state, regional, and local legislators
for legislative activities, 90 and to federal, state, and local judges for judicial activi-
ties. 91 The Court has also extended absolute official immunity to the President,
as well as to prosecutors and other executive-branch officials for activities con-
nected with the judicial process, such as the filing of criminal information. 92 The
Court has made clear, however, that aside from the President and officials en-
gaged in judicially related activities, executive-branch officials are not entitled to
absolute immunity.
93
Instead, most executive-branch officials have only "qualified" official im-
munity.94 That is, they are immune from monetary awards only if they did not
564, 574-75 (1959) (plurality opinion) (holding that federal officer absolutely immune from state tort
action for discretionary conduct).
88. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-64 (1978) (holding that judge had absolute
official immunity from action challenging his order permitting sterilization of fifteen-year-old girl
without her knowledge based on ex parte petition of her parents).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (Speech or Debate Clause); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S.
606, 613-27 (1972) (interpreting Speech or Debate Clause); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201-
05 (1880) (same).
90. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct. 966, 970-73 (1998) (holding that local legislators have
absolute immunity from action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for legislative activities); Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979) (same for regional legislators); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,376 (1951) (same for state legislators).
91. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978) (holding that federal officials have abso-
lute official immunity for adjudicative functions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978)
(holding that state judge has absolute immunity for judicial acts); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55
(1967) (holding that municipal judge has absolute official immunity for judicial acts); cf. Antoine v.
Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432-37 (1993) (holding that court reporters are not entitled to
absolute immunity); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (holding that judges are not abso-
lutely immune when acting in their administrative capacity).
92. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 511 (1997) (holding that prosecutor has absolute immu-
nity in performing traditional functions of an advocate); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982)
(holding that President had absolute immunity for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official du-
ties); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-31 (1976) (holding that prosecutor has absolute immunity
from action under Section 1983 for initiating prosecution).
93. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29 (1991) (stating, "This Court has refused to extend absolute
immunity beyond a very limited class of officials, including the President of the United States, legisla-
tors carrying out their legislative functions, and judges carrying out their judicial functions"); Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (holding that federal executive officials exercising discretion are
entitled to qualified immunity, unless "absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public
business"); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (stating in action against state official that "in
varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government");
see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520-24 (1985) (holding that Attorney General of United
States did not have absolute immunity for actions connected with national defense functions); Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1967) (maintaining that local police had only qualified immunity).
94. See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 509-10 (1997) (holding that prosecutor entitled to
only qualified immunity for filing certificate of probable cause); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-
49 (1974) (holding that state governor was entitled only to qualified immunity).
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violate legal norms that were "clearly established. '95 Although qualified immu-
nity does not provide absolute protection, it shields the official from most law-
suits. In a passage that the government is fond of quoting on behalf of its offi-
cials, the Court has said that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
96
Although the doctrine of official immunity does not bear directly on the
claims in Hopwood, it does help elucidate the nature of those claims. The Hop-
wood plaintiffs did not seek to hold any of the individual defendants personally
liable for money damages, having rather sued those defendants solely in their of-
ficial capacity.97 This is presumably because the Hopwood plaintiffs determined
that personal liability would have been barred by official immunity. Certainly,
the legal basis for the Fifth Circuit's decision invalidating the affirmative action
program was not "clearly established" at the time of that decision.
98
Officials in future cases similar to Hopwood may not be so lucky, depending
on where and when they were involved with affirmative action programs. After
Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit has clearly established that affirmative action pro-
grams like the Law School's violate the Equal Protection Clause. 99 Officials in
that circuit, therefore, cannot claim qualified immunity from personal liability
for devising and administering similar programs after the date of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision. Moreover, Hopwood reflects a trend in the lower federal courts
to strike down a variety of government affirmative action programs. 100 For at
95. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
96. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
97. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of claims asserted by the Hop-
wood plaintiffs.
98. See Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, J., joined by six other judges
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (asserting that panel opinion "goes out of its way to break
ground that the Supreme Court itself has been careful to avoid").
99. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 263 (1997) (observing that, in evaluating qualified
immunity defenses, Court has looked to circuit court decisions to determine whether law was "clearly
established").
100. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 794-809 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding unconstitu-
tional city's race-based admission policy for admission to public school); Monterey Mechanical Co. v.
Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 712-15 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding state statute providing for affirmative action in
government contracting unconstitutional); Engineering Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 122 F.3d 895, 906-29 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding county's affirmative action program for con-
tracting unconstitutional); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. Educ., School Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d
528, 534-40 (7th Cir. 1997) (invalidating numerous provisions in consent decree providing for desegre-
gation of public schools); Alexander v. Estepp, 95 F.3d 312, 315-17 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that city's
affirmative action program for firefighters unconstitutional), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1425 (1997); Mid-
dleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 404-13 (6th Cir. 1996) (striking down city's affirmative action pro-
gram for police promotions), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1552 (1997); Taxman v. Board of Educ., Piscata-
way Township, 91 F.3d 1547, 1556-65 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that school board violated Title
VII when it laid off white teacher, instead of equally qualified black teacher with equal seniority,
based on race), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506, cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997); Podberesky v. Kir-
wan, 38 F.3d 147, 152-61 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that race-conscious scholarship program of public
university unconstitutional), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995); cf. Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth
Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 675-77 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that public university not entitled to
summary judgment in Title VII action challenging pay raise for female faculty); see generally Adarand
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least some period of time, though, an official's exposure to personal liability will
depend on where he or she carries out official duties. For example, a law school
official in the Fifth Circuit could be held personally liable for conduct that would
not support personal liability in a circuit in which the relevant legal principles
were not yet "clearly established. '" 10 1
The geographical patchwork quality of official immunity is but one of two
ways in which the doctrine operates erratically. Official immunity distinguishes
among officials based, not only upon their geographic location, but, also upon
the branch of government with which their activities are connected. 1°2 Legisla-
tors and judges generally have absolute immunity, whereas executive officials
usually have only qualified immunity. 10 3 While legislators and judges arguably
are primarily responsible for adopting affirmative action programs and creating
precedent encouraging or mandating the development of such programs, only
officials in the executive branch will be held personally liable in damages for per-
forming the jobs the legislature and courts have assigned to them.'04
C. The Immunity of Cities and Counties
The United States Supreme Court has exacerbated the irrational pattern of
monetary liability for unconstitutional government conduct in another significant
way. The Court has consistently held that cities and counties, unlike states, can-
not claim eleventh amendment immunity.1 05 Cities and counties are, however,
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,213-35 (1995) (finding federal government's affirmative action
program for government contracting subject to strict scrutiny).
101. Compare Alexander, 95 F.3d at 317-18 (denying qualified immunity for officials' involve-
ment with affirmative action program), and Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1454-61 (7th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (same), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991), with Moniz v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 145 F.3d
1278, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 1998) (establishing that defendants had qualified immunity from action chal-
lenging affirmative action program for promotion of police officers); see also Harrison & Burrowes
Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1992) (granting qualified immunity);
Wittmer v. Peters, 904 F. Supp. 845, 853-55 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (same), affd on other grounds, 87 F.3d 916
(7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997); Baker v. Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(same), affd on other grounds, 704 F.2d 878, vacated, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
102. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 508 (1997) (explaining that prosecutor had absolute
immunity for activities connected with judicial process, but only qualified immunity for activities con-
nected with investigation of crime).
103. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of which officials receive
which type of immunity.
104. But cf. Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 396, 397-98, 400-05 (1987) (arguing that traditionally limited immunity accorded to ex-
ecutive-branch officials is justified by higher risk that officials in that branch, as compared to officials
in legislative and judicial branches, will directly cause injury).
105. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994) (noting that "cities and
counties do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity"); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,401 (1979) (stating that "the Court has consistently refused to construe
the [Eleventh] Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and munici-
palities"); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974) (noting that "while county action
is generally state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a county defendant is not neces-
sarily a state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment"); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
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bound to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment, and, a violation of this provi-
sion could result in a suit for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.106 As a re-
sult, a city or county can be held liable in money damages under Section 1983 for
the harm caused by any unconstitutional affirmative action program that it has
adopted, whereas a state is immune from such liability. Moreover, when a city or
county is sued under Section 1983, it cannot claim official immunity. 0 7 One can
reasonably wonder why local government is so disfavored.10 8
D. Summary of Immunity Principles Governing Monetary Damages
A person who has been injured by the unconstitutional conduct of a state or
local government or its officials may recover money damages in a federal court
in three situations: (1) A person may recover money from a state, an arm of the
state, or a state official in his or her official capacity only if the state has con-
sented to the lawsuit or Congress has abrogated eleventh amendment immunity
from the action; (2) a person can recover money damages from units of local
government, including cities and counties, as well as from their officials if sued in
their official capacity; and (3) a person can recover money from a state or local
official in his or her individual capacity (i.e., out of his or her own pocket), unless
(as is usually the case) the official has absolute official immunity or did not vio-
late clearly established law.
III. APPLICATION OF IMMUNITY PRINCIPLES TO MONETARY CLAIMS IN
HoPwoOD
An analysis of the monetary claims in Hopwood under the principles dis-
cussed in Part If entails two questions. The first is whether the defendants can
claim eleventh amendment immunity. If so, the second question is whether that
immunity has been abrogated by any of the constitutional or statutory provisions
on which the Hopwood plaintiffs base their monetary claims.'0 9 This Part con-
U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (rejecting county's eleventh amendment argument); Fletcher, supra note 7, at
1044 (observing that Eleventh Amendment "has never been extended to subdivisions of the state such
as cities, counties, and local school boards"); cf Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21
(1973) (holding that county was "citizen" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
106. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (holding that local
governments may be sued under Section 1983 for constitutional deprivations).
107. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (holding that a municipality
does not have qualified official immunity from Section 1983 action).
108. See Margreth Barrett, Note, The Denial of Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Political Sub-
divisions of the States: An Unjustified Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L. 1042, 1069 (1979) (con-
cluding that denial of eleventh amendment immunity to cities and counties "furthers no eleventh
amendment goals and is contrary to sound principles of federalism"). But cf. Melvyn R. Durchslag,
Should Political Subdivisions be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577,
581-82 (1994) (arguing that history and considerations of individuals' remedial rights justify differing
treatment of state and local governments under Eleventh Amendment); see also DeKalb County Sch.
Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 687-90 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that Eleventh Amendment and prin-
ciples of federalism barred claims by local school district for reimbursement from State for costs of
complying with desegregation order), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 601 (1997).
109. As discussed in Part II, in addition to Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
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cludes that all of the Hopwood defendants can claim eleventh amendment im-
munity and, more significantly, that none of the provisions upon which the plain-
tiffs rely abrogates this immunity with respect to monetary damages.
110
A. Which Hopwood Defendants Can Claim Eleventh Amendment Immunity?
The Hopwood plaintiffs named the following defendants: the State of
Texas; three other governmental entities (the University of Texas Board of Re-
gents, the University of Texas at Austin, and the Law School); and officials of
those three entities (the members of the Board, the President of the University,
the Dean of the Law School, and the Chairman of the Law School's Admission
Committee)."' The State plainly can invoke the Eleventh Amendment to resist
the monetary claims. Indeed, an unconsenting State cannot be sued in its own
name in federal court for any type of relief.112 Whether the other entities sued in
Hopwood-the Board, the University, and the Law School-can do so depends
on whether they are "arms" of the State.1t 3 Precedent establishes that these enti-
ment, a state can waive its eleventh amendment immunity. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying
text for a discussion of congressional abrogation and state waiver. The Hopwood plaintiffs, however,
did not have a plausible waiver argument. The State of Texas has preserved its sovereign immunity
with only limited exceptions not applicable to the Hopwood facts. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 107.002(a)(11) (legislative resolutions waiving sovereign immunity do not waive eleventh
amendment immunity); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.
1970) (maintaining that state retains immunity in absence of legislative waiver); see also TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021, 101.102 (authorizing claims against State under state tort law
to be brought in state court). Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 n.19 (1974) (rejecting
argument that State consented to federal court suit by consenting to similar suits in its own courts),
and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-80 (1946) (same), with Flores v. Nor-
ton & Ramsey Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 150, 152-54 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (holding that Texas Tort Claims
Act waived State's immunity from state tort claim in federal court).
110. It does not matter that the Hopwood defendants did not raise an Eleventh Amendment de-
fense on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text for an explanation
of how and why defendants dropped their eleventh amendment argument on appeal. The Court has
permitted defendants to invoke the Eleventh Amendment at any point in the proceedings, regardless
of whether they could have done so sooner. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 n.1 (1978)
(noting that defendants did not waive Eleventh Amendment defense by failing to raise it in the lower
court); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677-78 (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
466-67 (1945) (same). To this extent, the Eleventh Amendment "partakes of the nature of a jurisdic-
tional bar." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 678; cf Calderon v. Ashmus, 118 S. Ct. 1694, 1697 n.2 (1998) (noting
that Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it can be raised at any stage of proceeding
but "is not co-extensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III"); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 266 (1997) (stating that Eleventh Amendment "enacts a sovereign immunity from
suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction").
111. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,938 n.13 (5th Cir. 1996).
112. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
bars suit against State for prospective relief); Pugh, 438 U.S. at 781-82 (per curiam) (same); see also
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 70-74 (1985) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred declaratory
relief against state officials under circumstances of that case); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982)
(stating in action against state, officials that Eleventh Amendment bars federal court injunctive relief
directed against State).
113. See supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of entities that have been found to
be arms of the State.
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ties almost certainly do constitute "arms" of the State of Texas. n 4 Therefore,
these entities should be entitled to eleventh amendment immunity. Finally, be-
cause officials sued in their official capacity share the sovereign's immunity,
n5
the officials sued in Hopwood are also protected by the Eleventh Amendment."
6
The Court has generally used a fact-intensive approach to determine
whether a government entity is an "arm of the State."1' 7 The Court has made
clear, however, that a factor of prime importance is whether a money judgment
against the entity must be paid with state funds." 8 That focus reflects the
Court's understanding that the Eleventh Amendment was prompted by a desire
to protect state treasuries.1 9 The Court also considers any other factor relevant
to the entity's autonomy from the State. 20 The Court's focus on an entity's
autonomy underlies its categorical determination that cities and counties are not
arms of the State.12' The Court has not, however, made a similar categorical de-
114. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the other Hopwood defen-
dants and their "arms of state" status.
115. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relation between states and
entities deemed to be arms of the state.
116. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1995) (stating, "The only immunities that can
be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity,
may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment").
117. See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (stating that issue
whether defendant was "arm of the State partaking of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity"
depended on "the nature of the entity created by state law").
118. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (characterizing issue
whether judgment against entity would be payable out of state treasury as having "considerable impor-
tance" in determining whether entity can invoke Eleventh Amendment); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 45-51 (1994) (examining whether judgment against interstate agency
would be payable out of state treasuries); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (refer-
ring to "rule" that suit "seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment"); cf. Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S.
194, 199 (1929) (holding that state highway commission was not "citizen" for purposes of diversity ju-
risdiction because it was "alter ego of the state with no funds or ability to respond in damages").
119. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (observing that
"[a]doption of the [Eleventh] Amendment responded most immediately to the States' fears that 'fed-
eral courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their financial ruin'
(quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing))); cf Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (stating, "The Eleventh
Amendment does not exist solely in order to preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out
of a State's treasury; it also serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted;
brackets in original).
120. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 n.1 (1997) (holding that Board of Police Com-
missioners of St. Louis, Missouri not arm of State because City was responsible for Board's financial
liabilities and Board was "not subject to the State's direction or control in any other respect").
121. See Doe, 519 U.S. at 429 n.5 (questioning whether entity "has the same kind of independent
status as a county or is instead an arm of the State"); Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. Educ., 429 U.S. at
280-81 (posing question whether entity "is to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other politi-
cal subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend"); see also Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 721 (1973) (examining whether county possessed "a sufficiently independent
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termination for state colleges and universities. 12
2
Nonetheless, the lower federal courts have almost unanimously held that
state colleges and universities are arms of the State.1 23 Those holdings encom-
pass not only suits naming such colleges and universities as defendants, but also
suits naming their governing boards as defendants.12 4 The handful of cases
holding to the contrary have involved unusual circumstances, such as the school's
history as a private institution or its structural independence from the State.
25
The Fifth Circuit is among the courts that have consistently found state
colleges and universities to be arms of the State. 26 In particular, the Fifth Cir-
corporate character to dictate that it be treated as a citizen" of State for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion).
122. See, e.g., Doe, 519 U.S. at 429-30 (rejecting argument that state university could be sued in
federal court, notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment, because judgment against university would be
paid by federal government under indemnity agreement); Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221
U.S. 636, 645-48 (1911) (holding that state college did not have eleventh amendment immunity). See
infra note 125 for a discussion of this case.
123. See, e.g., University of Rhode Island v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200, 1204 (1st Cir.
1993) (observing that "the vast majority of state universities ... have been found to be 'arms' of the
State for immunity and diversity purposes," even though each university must be examined individu-
ally); Lawrence Lee Oldaker & David L. Dagley, The Eleventh Amendment, Its History and Current
Application to Schools and Universities, 72 ED. LAW. REP. 479,494 (1992) (stating, "Public universities
are generally understood to be indistinguishable arms of the state and therefore receive [Eleventh
Amendment] immunity"); Brief for Petitioners at 13 n.6, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S.
425 (1997) (No. 95-1694) (collecting cases); see also Kevin W. Brown, Public Institutions of Higher
Learning as "Persons" Subject to Suit Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 65 A.L.R. FED. 490, § 4 (1983) (discuss-
ing immunity of colleges and universities in Section 1983 cases).
124. See, e.g., Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment barred claim against Board of Regents of University of Arizona).
125. See Kovats v. Rutgers, The State University, 822 F.2d 1303, 1306-12 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that Rutgers University did not have eleventh amendment immunity, based in part on its history as
private institution); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding
that public junior college did not have eleventh amendment immunity "[uinder the peculiar Texas
statutory and decisional law governing junior college districts"); see also University of Rhode Island v.
A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200, 1205-17 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that University of Rhode Island
was citizen, rather than arm of State, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
These lower-court cases are consistent with the only Supreme Court decision that has addressed
whether a state institution of higher education can claim eleventh amendment immunity: Hopkins v.
Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911). The Court there held that Clemson was not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment protection. Id. at 642-48. The basis for that holding is not altogether clear.
The Court seemed, however, to rely on Clemson's independence from state control. See id. at 646
(noting that relevant state statute "created an entity, a corporation, a juristic person, whose right to
hold and use property was coupled with the provision that it might sue and be sued, plead and be im-
pleaded, in its corporate name"). That independence arose from factors that do not characterize most
modern state colleges and universities. Specifically, the majority of Clemson's Board of Trustees was
not chosen by any state entity or official. Id. at 638. Moreover, the Board was incorporated, could
enter into contracts, hold property, and sue or be sued in its own name. Id. at 638-39.
126. See Lewis v. Midwestern State Univ., 837 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying three-part
test to determine whether public university and its board of regents were arms of State: (1) status of
university under state law; (2) degree of state control over university; and (3) whether money judg-
ment against university would interfere with State's fiscal autonomy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988);
United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents of Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 553, 557-61 (5th
Cir. 1982) (applying same test).
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cuit has accorded "arm of the State" status to several Texas institutions of higher
education. 27 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has assumed, and a district court
within the Fifth Circuit has held that the University of Texas System is an arm of
the State. 28 There is, therefore, strong support for the conclusion that, in addi-
tion to the State of Texas itself, two of the other defendant-entities in Hopwood,
namely, the Board and the University, can also claim eleventh amendment im-
munity.
The Law School, too, can probably claim eleventh amendment immunity.
Doubt arises only because of the paucity of case law regarding the eleventh
amendment status of state law schools. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth
Circuit has addressed that issue. A district court within the Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, has held that a state law school is an arm of the State.129 That holding ac-
cords with both appellate and district court decisions in other circuits.130 The
University of Texas Law School possesses no distinctive characteristics that
would compel a different conclusion.'
3'
127. See Lewis, 837 F.2d at 199 (recognizing "arm of State" status for Midwestern State Univer-
sity); United Carolina Bank, 665 F.2d at 556-61 (recognizing same for Stephen F. Austin University);
Clay v. Texas Women's Univ., 728 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing same for Texas Women's Uni-
versity); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1174-76 (5th Cir. 1976) (recognizing same for Mississippi
State University), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); see also University of Texas at Austin v. Vratil, 96
F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that University of Texas at Austin was entitled to eleventh
amendment immunity from civil discovery); cf. Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d
160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that, under Ex parte Young, Eleventh Amendment did not bar
declaratory and injunctive relief against public university), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980). But cf.
Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 278-80 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that, in light of
"peculiar" statutory and decisional law, public junior college did not have eleventh amendment immu-
nity).
128. See Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820 n.10 (5th Cir. 1998) (treating University of Texas as
arm of State where parties did not dispute University's status as such); LaVerne v. University of Texas
Sys., 611 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (granting motion to dismiss action against State of Texas,
University of Texas, Chancellor of University, and other officials sued in official capacity); see also
Chacko v. Texas A & M Univ., 960 F. Supp. 1180, 1198 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that Texas A & M
entitled to eleventh amendment immunity); Idoux v. Lamar Univ. Sys., 817 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (E.D.
Tex. 1993) (holding that Lamar University entitled to eleventh amendment immunity); Texas Faculty
Ass'n v. University of Texas at Dallas, No. CA-3-88-2917-AH, 1990 WL 161244, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
26, 1990) (unpublished decision) (holding that Eleventh Amendment protected University of Texas at
Dallas and Board of Regents of University of Texas System), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 946 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1991).
129. See Moreno v. Texas S. Univ., 573 F. Supp. 73, 73-75 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (finding Thurgood
Marshall School of Law and its deans to be arms of State and immune from monetary damages under
Eleventh Amendment).
130. See Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 865 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending eleventh amendment
immunity from monetary suits to federal constitutional claims); Hall v. Hawaii, 791 F.2d 759, 761 (9th
Cir. 1986) (finding University of Hawaii law school and its Board of Regents to be arms of state and
immune from state law claims under Eleventh Amendment); Chinn v. City Univ. of N.Y., 963 F. Supp.
218, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (maintaining that Eleventh Amendment barred Section 1981 claim against
City University of New York's law school); Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74, 75-79 (6th Cir. 1975)
(holding that Eleventh Amendment barred action against Memphis State University brought by for-
mer law students challenging state law school's higher tuition charges for residents).
131. See generally TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 65.02(a)(2) (making University of Texas at Austin
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The same analysis applicable to the University, the Board, and the Law
School also controls the availability of the eleventh amendment defense to the
individual Hopwood defendants. Because those defendants are officials of arms
of the State and are sued for damages in their official capacity they, too, can
claim eleventh amendment immunity.
132
B. Which Provisions Abrogate Eleventh Amendment Immunity?
Because the Hopwood defendants can invoke eleventh amendment immu-
nity, the Hopwood plaintiffs may recover relief in the form of money damages
only if immunity from that relief has been abrogated by one of the provisions on
which the plaintiffs rely. In seeking compensatory and punitive damages, the
plaintiffs rely on the Fourteenth Amendment and three federal statutes: 42
U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.133
In seeking attorneys' fees, the plaintiffs rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1988.134 It is clear
that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the first two statutes, Sections 1981
and 1983, abrogate eleventh amendment immunity from monetary damages. 135
It is unsettled whether Title VI does so, but this Article concludes that it does
not because Title VI does not make sufficiently clear Congress's intention to
authorize money damages against the State and its officers.136 Finally, although
Section 1988 may not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, it will permit the de-
fendants to recover a portion of their attorneys' fees.
137
1. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment does not, of its own force, override a state's
eleventh amendment immunity from money damages. Thus, for example, a fed-
eral court cannot award money damages against a State merely because the State
has violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying someone admission to a
state school because of his or her race. Instead, the court can rely on the Equal
Protection Clause only to enjoin State officials from committing future viola-
tions. This limit on the remedial power of the federal courts is odd for at least
two reasons. First, although it represents a significant restriction on the enforce-
ability of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did not articulate it clearly for
more than a century after adoption of the Amendment.t 38 Second, this remedial
part of "University of Texas System" ("System")), 67.02 (putting University of Texas at Austin under
management and control of Board of Regents of System) (West 1991).
132. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-67 (1974) (holding that Eleventh Amend-
ment barred action against state official for monetary relief payable from state treasury).
133. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 553 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
134. Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 911 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
135. See infra notes 138-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutes and judicial
interpretation.
136. See infra notes 161-256 and accompanying text for an analysis of the availability of monetary
damages for Title VI violations.
137. See infra notes 257-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section 1988 and the
Court's interpretation permitting recovery of attorney's fees.
138. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523 (1997) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment
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restriction binds the federal courts but not Congress.139
Not long after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held
that a state cannot be sued directly for a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, because such a suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 40 In Ex parte
Young, however, the Court held that a state officer could be sued in equity for a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (or any other provision of the Constitu-
tion), despite the Eleventh Amendment. 4 ' The Court in Ex parte Young, how-
ever, did not explain what types of relief could be granted in such an officer
suit.142 It simply upheld a federal-court injunction prohibiting a state official
from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute. 43 For years, it was unclear to
what extent Ex parte Young authorized other sorts of relief, such as money dam-
ages payable out of the state treasury. 144
The Court squarely addressed that issue in 1974 in Edelman v. Jordan.145
The Edelman Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not authorize
retroactive monetary relief against a State, even for a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 146 The Court said, "A federal court's remedial power, consistent
was adopted in 1868). See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which the Court described as the first case to fully explore state payment
of retroactive monetary relief under the Eleventh Amendment.
139. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress's power under
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity.
140. See North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 25, 30 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amend-
ment barred federal-court action against State alleging violations of Contract Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment).
141. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,149-68 (1908).
142. Id.
143. Id. In the statement of the case, Justice Peckham related that the State Attorney General
was held in contempt for violating a federal order prohibiting him from bringing proceedings to en-
force an unconstitutional statute against the plaintiffs. Id. at 126-27.
144. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-72 (discussing Supreme Court precedents after Ex parte Young
involving federal-court actions against state officials); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(holding that denial of welfare benefits based on durational residency requirement violates Constitu-
tion); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that Constitution required minority student be
admitted to University of Texas School of Law pursuant to mandamus action); see also Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 516 (1954) (appearing to
read Ex parte Young as permitting only negative injunctive relief against officials, as distinguished
from injunctive relief imposing affirmative obligations); Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1119 n.324 (asserting
need to distinguish between forms of affirmative relief arose only after affirmative injunctions became
available). The Court in Edelman maintained that it did not read Ex parte Young or subsequent
holdings to mean that any form of relief can be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely
it resembles a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, just because the relief is labeled "eq-
uitable" in nature. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666.
145. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court described the case as the first opportunity it had "taken to
fully explore and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects" of retroactive monetary relief payable out
of the state treasury. Id. at 670-71.
146. Id. at 677. The plaintiff in Edelman claimed that the defendant officials had violated the
Equal Protection Clause by delaying the processing of his claim for welfare benefits while processing
and allowing the claims of similarly situated applicants. Id. at 653 n.1. As a remedy for that violation,
the plaintiff sought an injunction requiring the officials to use state funds to pay benefits that, because
of delay, had not been paid. Id. at 668. The Court noted that the retroactive monetary award sought
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with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive
relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of
funds from the state treasury.
'147
Curiously, Congress does not suffer from a similar remedial constraint.
When enacting legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has
"undoubted power" to abrogate the State's eleventh amendment immunity from
retroactive monetary relief.148 In recently reaffirming that power, the Court in
Seminole Tribe reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment was "adopted well af-
ter the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment" and "operated to alter the pre-
existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment.1' 49 That reasoning would seem to support the power of
federal courts to award whatever relief against the states is appropriate to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment, including retroactive monetary relief. 150
As it stands, the Hopwood plaintiffs cannot rely on the Fourteenth
Amendment alone to recover monetary damages in federal court.1 51 Instead,
they must show that they are entitled to such relief under a statute falling within
one of the constitutional grants of power that enables Congress to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment, such as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 152 If
by plaintiff "will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds, and not from the pockets of the indi-
vidual state officials who were the defendants in the action." Id.
147. Id. at 677 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979) (describing Edelman
as reaffirming rule that had evolved in Court's "earlier cases that a suit in federal court by private par-
ties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred
by the Eleventh Amendment").
148. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
149. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,65-66 (1996).
150. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 350-53, 351 n.296 (1995) (arguing that federal courts, as well as Congress, have power to remedy
Fourteenth Amendment violations notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment); cf John E. Nowak, The
Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History
of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1441-42 (1975) (arguing that
Congress, rather than federal courts, should exercise power to override eleventh amendment immu-
nity for states' violations of Fourteenth Amendment); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immuni-
ties in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Feder-
alism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693 (1976) (same).
151. See Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 28-32 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment did not, of its own force, create a cause of action for ret-
roactive monetary relief against State in federal court), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992); see also
DeKalb Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 688 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court
has found no general abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims brought pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment," but Congress can abrogate that immunity), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 601
(1997).
152. When the Court in Ex parte Young held that injunctive relief was available against a state
official for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not identify any federal statute that gave
the plaintiff a cause of action against the official. The Court thereby implied that the Fourteenth
Amendment, standing alone, not only overrode the Eleventh Amendment but also created a private
cause of action in federal court for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Meltzer, supra note
63, at 38 (noting that Ex parte Young "in effect recognized an implied federal cause of action for an
injunctive remedy against state officials whose conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also
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the Fourteenth Amendment did create a private cause of action, a further ques-
tion would be whether money damages could be awarded on Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
153
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 authorizes federal courts to award money damages to anyone
who has been deprived "of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and [federal] laws" by any "person" acting under color of state
law. 154 The Court in Edelman appeared to reject the suggestion that Section
1983 "was intended to create a waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity."1 55 In Quern v. Jordan, the Court squarely held that Section 1983 indeed
did not "override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States" from suits in
federal court.1 56 Quern forecloses relief under Section 1983 in federal-court ac-
tions against States, arms of the State, and state officials sued in their official ca-
pacity. 157 It is therefore clear that the Hopwood plaintiffs cannot recover mone-
tary damages under Section 1983.
Monaghan, supra note 71, at 130-31 (noting that Ex pane Young "necessarily assumed" implied right
of action for equitable relief against State officials); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 n.53 (1984) (observing that Ex pane
Young "marked the emergence of the idea that conduct threatening to violate federal constitutional
rights... was inherently actionable as a matter of federal law").
Later decisions seemed to confirm the suggestion in Ex parte Young that the Fourteenth
Amendment created a private cause of action in federal court, because they upheld prospective relief
for federal-court claims that were ostensibly based on the Fourteenth Amendment alone. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954) (granting equal access to nonsegregated education un-
der Fourteenth Amendment); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (assigning equal protection to
legal education under Fourteenth Amendment); see also Bandes, supra note 150, at 290, 290 n.2 (1995)
(citing Brown as case where court enforced constitutional rights without statutory cause of action).
Nonetheless, the Court has never squarely addressed whether the Fourteenth Amendment itself cre-
ates a federal cause of action. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 n.23 (1977) (determining that,
in light of Court's holding that monetary relief granted by lower court fell within Ex pane Young doc-
trine, Court did not need to decide whether "the Fourteenth Amendment, ex proprio vigore, works a
pro tanto repeal of the Eleventh Amendment").
153. Although such damages would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment if sought in federal
court, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar them in a state-court action, because the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar actions filed in state court. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980)
(noting that Eleventh Amendment question is absent in state court since it retains only "Judicial
power of the United States"); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment did not limit State's judicial powers in its courts in tort action involving sister state's vehi-
cle). But see Richard H. Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts, 3-5 (forth-
coming Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with Brandeis Law Review) (arguing that Tenth
Amendment does not immunize states in their own courts from private actions based on federal stat-
utes enacted under Article I).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
155. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651.676 (1974).
156. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). The Court in Quern determined that Section
1983 did not express a sufficiently clear intention to abrogate the State's eleventh amendment immu-
nity from suit in federal court. Id.
157. See also, Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (holding that neither State
nor its officials acting in official capacities are persons covered by Section 1983).
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3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Section 1981 likewise does not help the Hopwood plaintiffs. This statute
gives everyone "the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens," to, "make and
enforce contracts" free of state interference. 158 In Jett v. Dallas Independent
School District, however, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 1983 pro-
vides the exclusive federal basis for money damages for violations of Section
1981 by "state governmental units."1 59 Although Jett involved an agency of local
government, the Court's reasoning applies equally to actions against state enti-
ties and their officials. 16 Jett establishes that Section 1981 does not provide an
independent cause of action in a case such as Hopwood.
4. Title VI
a. The Unsettled Availability of Monetary Damages for Title VI Violations
Title VI prohibits racial discrimination by recipients of federal financial as-
sistance.161 It furnishes the most promising basis for the Hopwood plaintiffs to
recover money damages. The Fifth Circuit held that the Hopwood defendants
intentionally violated Title VI, 162 and the Supreme Court has made clear that
money damages are available for such violations. 163 The decisions of the Court
so indicating, however, did not concern a defendant that was entitled to eleventh
amendment immunity. Indeed, the Court has not addressed whether Title VI
abrogates eleventh amendment immunity from retroactive monetary relief. Al-
though the lower federal courts have held that Title VI does so,164 this Article
reaches a contrary conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood establishes that the defendants are
liable in money damages under Title VI, unless liability is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The Fifth Circuit held that the Law School's admission program
violated the Equal Protection Clause.1 65 That holding is tantamount to a holding
that the Law School violated Title VI, in light of Supreme Court decisions mak-
ing clear that, when a state entity receiving federal financial assistance violates
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
159. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989) (citing Brown v. General Servs.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976)).
160. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667 n.12 (noting that "county action is generally state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment").
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. See supra note 19 for relevant portion of statute.
162. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 957 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendants "committed
intentional discrimination").
163. See infra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court cases indi-
cating monetary damages are available for intentional Title VI violations.
164. See infra note 176 for cases holding that Title VI abrogates eleventh amendment immunity
from retroactive monetary relief.
165. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal protection claim and
the judicial analysis. The Fifth Circuit addressed only the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, not their
statutory claims, finding the latter to be merely "derivative" of the former. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
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the Equal Protection Clause, it has also violated Title VI.166 The Fifth Circuit in
Hopwood further held that the defendants "committed intentional discrimina-
tion. 1 67 In several decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated that Title VI
authorizes money damages for intentional violations of Title VI. 168 In none of
those decisions, however, was the defendant an entity entitled to eleventh
amendment immunity. 169 Consequently, the Court has not addressed whether
Title VI abrogates the Eleventh Amendment. Unless Title VI does so, the
Hopwood plaintiffs cannot recover money damages for violations of that statute.
The issue of whether Title VI abrogates eleventh amendment immunity
from money damages has great importance. Title VI is a major anti-
discrimination measure, banning racial discrimination by all state entities that
receive federal financial assistance. Moreover, if Title VI exposes states to
money damages, it does so by virtue of a statute that also governs the remedies
166. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610 (1983) (Powell, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and, in relevant part, by Rehnquist, J.) (noting that Title VI proscribes only those racial
classifications that violate Equal Protection Clause); id. at 615 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (accepting,
on stare decisis grounds, holding of majority in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
that "Title VI's definition of racial discrimination [is] absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's");
id. at 617 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that Court in Bakke considered Title VI's proscrip-
tion on racial discrimination to be coextensive with Fourteenth Amendment's, but arguing Title VI
also bars conduct that does not constitute intentional discrimination, and therefore would not violate
Fourteenth Amendment under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); see also United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992) (stating that Bakke and its progeny make clear "that the reach of
Title VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment").
167. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 957 (5th Cir. 1996).
168. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992) (stating that "a clear major-
ity" of the Court in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), expressed the view
that money damages are available for intentional violations of Title VI); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607
n.27 (noting that majority of Court "would not allow compensatory relief" under Title VI "in the ab-
sence of proof of discriminatory intent"); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996) (recognizing
money damages are available under Title VI).
169. Although the Court has said in three cases that money damages are available for intentional
Title VI violations, see supra note 168 (citing cases), only in one of those cases, Guardians, was the
issue squarely presented, and that case did not resolve the Eleventh Amendment issue. In Guardians,
the defendants were a department of city government and city officials-entities that are not protected
by the Eleventh Amendment. For this reason, the Court did not need to resolve the issue of money
damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 604 (White, J., joined in part by Rehnquist, J.) (ac-
knowledging that "Eleventh Amendment cases are not dispositive here," but finding them useful by
analogy); id. at 633 n.28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that "Eleventh Amendment considerations
have absolutely no relevance to this case because [defendants] are not state but rather municipal enti-
ties"); id. at 637-38 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he
Eleventh Amendment obviously has no relevance in most Title VI litigation; it certainly is not impli-
cated in this suit against the ... officials and agencies of the City of New York").
In Franklin, another case against a local government entity that, as such, did not have Eleventh
Amendment protection, the Court addressed whether monetary damages were available under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 62-63 (involving school district and
teacher employed by district as defendants).
In Lane, the Court held that sovereign immunity barred an award of money damages against the
federal government in an action for a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Lane,
518 U.S. at 192.
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available against states for violations of three other major anti-discrimination
statutes: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimi-
nation based on a disability in federal programs;1 70 Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in public education;
71
and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, which prohibits discrimination in feder-
ally assisted programs. 172 Under all four of these anti-discrimination statutes, the
provision governing remedies against the states is Section 1003 of the (somewhat
confusingly named) Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986.173
Section 1003 clearly expresses Congress's intent to abrogate the states'
eleventh amendment immunity.1 74 It declares that "[a] State shall not be im-
mune under the Eleventh Amendment ... from suit in Federal court for a viola-
tion of" the four enumerated anti-discrimination statutes. 175 At least two federal
courts of appeals have concluded that Section 1003 exposes states to money
damages for violations of these statutes.1 76 In so concluding, these courts use the
170. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
171. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 6101-6107 (1994).
173. See Pub. L. No. 99-506, Tit. X, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(revoking state immunity under Eleventh Amendment for violations of these statutes); see also Lane
v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996) (referring to provision as Section 1003 of Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986).
174. 42 U.S.C. §2000d-7(a)(1). See Lane, 518 U.S. at 198 (1996) (describing Section 1003 as
"unequivocal waiver" of States' eleventh amendment immunity).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1). Section 1003 abrogates the Eleventh Amendment not only for
violations of the four named statutes but also for violations "of any other Federal statute prohibiting
discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance." Id.
176. See Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
7(a)(1) abrogates eleventh amendment immunity from claim for monetary relief under Rehabilitation
Act); Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 669-70 (11th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
7(a)(1) abrogates eleventh amendment immunity from claims for retroactive monetary relief under
Rehabilitation Act), vacated and withdrawn on other grounds sub noi. Duffy and Lussier appear to
be the only decisions by federal courts of appeals specifically addressing the availability of money
damages under Section 1003.
In other cases in which the federal courts have addressed Section 1003, either the plaintiff has not
sought money damages or the opinion does not specify the remedy sought. See Franks v. Kentucky
Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) abrogated
eleventh amendment immunity from claims for unspecified relief under Title IX); Doe v. University of
Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 656-60 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) abrogated elev-
enth amendment immunity from claim for unspecified relief under Title IX), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. July 13, 1998) (No. 98-126); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) abrogated eleventh amendment immunity from claim for
injunctive relief under Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); Crawford v. Davis, 109
F.3d 1281, 1282-83 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) abrogated eleventh amend-
ment immunity from claims for unspecified relief under Title IX); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75-
76 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 authorized "compensatory education award" with-
out deciding whether monetary award was retroactive or prospective); see also Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 1234, 1272-74 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 abrogated eleventh
amendment immunity from suit for declaratory and injunctive relief from violations of Title VI);
Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that state education department not
immune from suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Title VI violations), affd on other
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two-part inquiry, suggested in Seminole Tribe, that asks (1) whether Congress
expressed with sufficient clarity an intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment; and (2) if so, whether Congress had the constitutional power to do so.
177
The lower courts have concluded that Congress expressed an unambiguous in-
tention in Section 1003 to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment and that it had the
power to do so under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
178
These lower court decisions can plausibly be challenged on two grounds in-
sofar as they relate to claims under Title VI. In his certiorari petition for the
Hopwood defendants, Professor Tribe argued that Congress lacked the constitu-
tional power to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity for violations of Title
VI. 179 As discussed in the next subsection, that argument, though plausible, rests
on a faulty premise. This Article nevertheless agrees that Congress did not ef-
fectively abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity from money dam-
ages in federal court. As explained in subsection c, that conclusion rests on Su-
preme Court precedents indicating that Congress did not make sufficiently clear
an intention in Section 1003 to expose states to that type of relief.180
b. The Hopwood Defendants' Argument Against Title VI Damages Claims
Professor Tribe's argument was straightforward: Congress enacted Title VI
in the exercise of its power under the Spending Clause of Article 1.181 Seminole
Tribe makes clear that Congress cannot use its Article I powers to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment.182 Therefore, regardless of Congress's intention, Title VI
does not authorize federal courts to award retroactive monetary relief against
grounds, 37 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1994); Nihiser v. Ohio Envt'l Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168,1169,
1176 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding, in action for unspecified relief, that reasonable accommodation provi-
sions of Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act did not fall within Congress's power
under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615,
617, 619 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating, in case where it was not clear whether money damages were sought,
that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 "does abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from Title VI and
Title IX claims").
177. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). See, e.g., Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136
F.3d 430, 433 (1998) (stating that "Seminole Tribe established a two-pronged test for determining the
validity of Congress's abrogation of state immunity through the exercise of its Section 5 enforcement
power"), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 320 (U.S. Oct. 5,1998) (No. 97-1941).
178. See, e.g., Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1282-83 (noting that Congress "unequivocally" intended to
abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity rights, and Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment
grants Congress broad enforcement authority).
179. Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 23.
180. See infra notes 192-213 for a discussion of Supreme Court cases that establish a remedy-
specific clear statement rule. Under the analysis proposed in this Article, unlike that advanced in Pro-
fessor Tribe's petition for certiorari, Congress could amend Title VI to authorize money damages
against the States for violations of it. See infra note 255 (discussing Congress's power to enact such
amendment under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
181. Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 23; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("Congress
shall have Power... to... provide for ... the general Welfare of the United States"); see also South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-11 (1987) (discussing Congress's power under Spending Clause).
182. Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 23; see also supra notes 69-71 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Seminole Tribe.
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unconsenting states." 3 By virtue of the Ex parte Young doctrine, the federal
courts are solely empowered to award prospective relief against the state officials
responsible for violations of Title VI. 184
The problem with Professor Tribe's argument is its premise that Title VI
rests solely on the Spending Clause. The premise is plausible, because a majority
of the Supreme Court in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Sevice Commission described
Title VI as a Spending Clause statute.'85 Guardians was decided, however, be-
fore Congress amended Title VI in 1986 by enacting Section 1003.186 The legisla-
tive history of Section 1003 indicates that it was enacted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Spending Clause. 187  More fundamen-
tally, Congress did not need to express an intention to rely on Section 5 for Title
VI to be upheld as an exercise of Section 5.188 The Fifth Circuit has said that
"the Court has been cautious about attributing Congressional intent to act under
its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 189 This is true when the
183. Hopwood cert. petition, supra note 22, at 23-24.
184. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ex parte Young doc-
trine.
185. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983) (opinion of White, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J.) (stating "Title VI is spending-power legislation"); id. at 633 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (referring to Justice White's "accurate characterization of Title VI as a contractual spending
power provision") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.) (describing Title VI as "spending power legislation"); see also Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1398 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (stating that, "[in
Guardians... at least six members of the Supreme Court agreed that Title VI was enacted under the
Spending Clause"), cert. granted in part, (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843); cf. Rowinsky v. Bryan
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.14 (5th Cir.) (stating that "[i]n Guardians, at least five Justices
held that [Tlitle VI was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
186. In a case decided after 1986, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether Title IX,
a statute modeled on Title VI, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979), was
enacted not only under the Spending Clause but also under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 n.8 (1992).
187. See 132 CONG. REC. S28, 622-23 (1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston reading letter from U.S.
Department of Justice stating that Section 1003 rested on both Spending Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); 131 CONG. REc. S22, 346 (1985) (statement of Sen. Cranston, sponsor of
predecessor to bill enacted as 1986 legislation, stating that bill was "clearly authorized" by Section 5 of
Fourteenth Amendment and Spending Clause); see also S. REP. No. 99-388, at 27 (interpreting Court's
decision in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), as permitting "exceptions" to Elev-
enth Amendment for federal statutes passed under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment and Spending
Clause).
188. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243-44 n.18 (1983) (rejecting argument that "Congress
need anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'equal protection,' for
'[t]he constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it
undertakes to exercise"' (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948))); see also
Franks v. Kentucky Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1998) (determining that absence of
evidence that Congress intended to rely on Section 5 in enacting Section 1003 "not fatal" to claim that
Section 1003 fell within Section 5); Abril v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1998) (same); Doe v.
University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281,
1283 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).
189. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 165 (1996); accord Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
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Court is interpreting a statute that, it is claimed, was enacted under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.190 In EEOC v. Wyoming, however, the Court
made clear that no such caution is appropriate when, instead of deciding what a
statute means, the Court must decide whether Congress had the power to enact
it.191 The Fifth Circuit's decisions in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School
District and Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija are consistent with this
distinction, because each involved a question of statutory interpretation, rather
than a question of congressional power.192 Although Professor Tribe was well
within the bounds of advocacy in basing his eleventh amendment argument on
the premise that Title VI rests solely on the Spending Clause, that premise
should be rejected.
c. An Analysis of the Title VI Damages Claims under the Supreme Court's
Clear Statement Cases
This author agrees with Professor Tribe that Title VI does not abrogate
eleventh amendment immunity from money damages. That is not because Con-
gress lacked the power to do so, but because Congress did not express its inten-
tion to do so with the clarity required by Supreme Court precedent. The lower
courts that have held that Title VI does expose states to money damages have
relied on Congress's clear expression in Section 1003 to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity to some extent. 193 That approach is not sufficiently dis-
criminating under Supreme Court precedent governing the interpretation of
statutes that eliminate sovereign immunity. Those precedents establish what
might be called a "remedy-specific" clear statement rule. The rule requires fed-
eral statutes that eliminate sovereign immunity to be construed not to authorize
money damages if they can plausibly be read to exclude that type of relief. Of
particular relevance here is the Court's suggestion that Section 1003 can plausi-
bly be read not to authorize money damages against the states.
The earliest of the Court's decisions applying the remedy-specific clear
statement rule construed former Section 106(c) of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code. 194 Section 106(c) provided that, "notwithstanding any assertion of sover-
eign immunity," a "determination" by a court under specified provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code would "bind[] governmental units."195 In Hoffman v. Con-
necticut Department of Income Maintenance, the Court held that Section 106(c)
nied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997).
190. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981).
191. 460 U.S. at 243 n.18 (distinguishing approach in Pennhurst as applicable to questions of
statutory interpretation and not questions of congressional power).
192. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008 (identifying question as whether Title IX imposed liability on
school district for sexual harassment of student by peers); Leija, 101 F.3d at 395 (identifying issue as
whether Title IX imposed strict liability on school for sexual abuse of student by teacher).
193. See, e.g., Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447,452 (9th Cir. 1996).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988), recodified and amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-394, tit. I, § 113, 108 Stat. 4107 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994)).
195. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1989) (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988)).
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did not authorize monetary relief against a state in a federal bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. 196 The Court determined that the language of Section 106(c) was "more
indicative of declaratory and injunctive relief than of monetary recovery," and
therefore did not satisfy the Court's clear-statement rule. 1
97
In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,198 the Court extended Hoffman by
holding that former Section 106(c) did not waive the federal government's sov-
ereign immunity from retroactive monetary relief.199 Again, the Court relied on
the clear-statement rule.2°° The Court in Nordic Village framed the rule in a way
that required a clear expression of congressional intent, not only to eliminate
sovereign immunity, but also, and more specifically, to authorize money dam-
ages. The Court explained that the existence of a "plausible" interpretation of
Section 106(c) under which monetary relief was not authorized sufficed "to es-
tablish that a reading imposing monetary liability on the Government is not 'un-
ambiguous' and therefore should not be adopted. '201 As construed by the Court,
Section 106(c) eliminated the federal government's sovereign-immunity defense
only with respect to declaratory and injunctive relief.2°2
In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,203 the Court applied its rem-
edy-specific clear statement rule to a set of federal environmental statutes.2°4
The State of Ohio had relied on these statutes in seeking civil penalties from the
United States Department of Energy for illegal pollution at a federal uranium-
processing plant in Ohio.20 5 The Court held that the statutes waived federal sov-
ereign immunity from prospective, "coercive" relief-such as contempt fines to
ensure compliance with court orders-but not from retroactive, "punitive" re-
lief-such as monetary penalties for past violations.20 6 As in Nordic Village, it
196. Id. at 101-04 (plurality opinion); id. at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
197. Id. at 101-02.
198. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
199. Id. at 33-39.
200. See id. at 33 ("Waivers of the Government's sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be
'unequivocally expressed."' (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990))).
201. Id. at 37; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228-30 (1989) (holding that federal statute
did not authorize federal-court suits against States).
202. See Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. at 35 (finding that Section 106(c) could reasonably be read
to permit "declaratory and injunctive-though not monetary-relief against the Government") (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); id. at 36 (explaining that this reading served the important function of
allowing bankruptcy court, despite federal government's longstanding sovereign-immunity objections,
"to determine the amount and dischargeability of an estate's liability to the Government, such as un-
paid federal taxes"). In response to Hoffman and Nordic Village, Congress amended Section 106(c)
explicitly and unequivocally to permit monetary relief. See supra note 195 citing legislation amending
Section 106(c); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d 237, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that amendment
was intended to overrule Nordic Village).
203. 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
204. Id. at 611-15 (describing facts and procedural history of case).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 615-19 & n.15 (holding that citizen-suit provisions of Clean Water Act ("CWA")
waived federal sovereign immunity from actions for "coercive" relief, but not from actions for civil
penalties for past violations); id. at 620-27 (holding same with respect to provisions of CWA governing
federal facilities); id. at 627-28 (holding same with respect to federal-facilities provision of Resource
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was not enough for the Court in Department of Energy that the statutes ex-
pressed a clear intention to eliminate sovereign immunity; the Court insisted
they clearly express the specific intention to expose the sovereign to retroactive
monetary relief.
207
The most recent case applying the remedy-specific clear statement rule is
Lane v. Pea.20 8 James Griffin Lane sought compensatory damages for being
discharged from the United States Merchant Marine Academy because of his
diabetes, a claimed violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.209 The Court held that nothing in the Act waived the federal government's
sovereign immunity from money damages for such violations.210 Instead, the
Court maintained that the Act could be read to waive sovereign immunity only
with respect to prospective relief, such as injunctions against continuing viola-
tions.21' As in prior cases, the Court in Lane distinguished the issue of whether
the Act waived sovereign immunity from the issue of whether it authorized ret-
roactive monetary relief. The Court reasoned that "Congress is free to waive the
Federal Government's sovereign immunity against liability without waiving its
immunity from monetary damages awards." 21 2 Accordingly, "[t]o sustain a claim
that the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of
sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.
213
This reasoning also applies when Congress abrogates eleventh amendment im-
munity, as demonstrated by Hoffman.
214
Lane is important not only for its application of the remedy-specific clear
statement rule but also for its discussion of the very same statutory provision that
the Hopwood plaintiffs rely upon in seeking money damages under Title VI-
Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986. As discussed
above, Section 1003 governs remedies against the States for violations of Title VI
and other anti-discrimination statutes, including the Rehabilitation Act of
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA")).
207. See id. at 627 (stating, of CWA's federal-facilities provisions: "as against the clear waiver for
coercive fines the indication of a waiver as to those that are punitive is less certain. The rule of narrow
construction therefore takes the waiver no further than the coercive variety"); see also id. at 627-28
(agreeing with lower court that RCRA's federal-facility provision "can reasonably be interpreted as
including substantive standards and the means for implementing those standards, but excluding puni-
tive measures") (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
209. Id. at 189-90 (describing facts); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504(a), 87 Stat. 355,
codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of disability "under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency").
210. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191-97 (1996) (analyzing plaintiff's claim that money damages
against federal government were authorized by Sections 504(a) or 505(a)(2) of the Act, as construed in
light of Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986).
211. See id. at 190, 196 (noting that federal government did not dispute propriety of injunctive
relief granted by lower court in that case).
212. Id. at 196.
213. Id. at 192.
214. See supra notes 194-97 for a discussion of Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Mainte-
nance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989)).
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1973.215 To understand Lane's relevance to the Title VI claims in Hopwood, one
must examine the structure and text of Section 1003, Mr. Lane's argument re-
garding Section 1003, and the Lane Court's response to that argument.
Section 1003 consists of two subsections, though only the first-subsection
(a)-is relevant here (subsection (b) is merely an effective-date provision).
216
Subsection (a) is divided into two parts. Subsection (a)(1) provides:
(a) General provision
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any
other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Fed-
eral financial assistance.
217
This part of subsection (a) unambiguously expresses Congress's intent to
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity for violations of certain anti-
discrimination statutes.218 Subsection (a)(2) describes the remedies available
against a State that violates one of those statutes:
(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in
paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity)
are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies
are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or pri-
vate entity other than a State.
219
The bifurcation of Section 1003(a) is significant because it emphasizes Con-
gress's separately expressed intention to not only abrogate the States' eleventh
amendment immunity from liability but to authorize certain remedies against
them.
220
Mr. Lane relied on Section 1003 to argue that two other provisions, both
contained in the Rehabilitation Act, waived the federal government's sovereign
immunity from money damages for violations of Section 504 of that Act.221 In
particular, Lane argued that Section 1003(a)(2) "reveals congressional intent to
equalize the remedies available against all defendants. '222 He relied on Section
215. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section 1003 of the Reha-
bilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1845, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(1994).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994).
218. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996) (stating that, "[b]y enacting § 1003, Congress
sought to provide the sort of unequivocal waiver that our precedents demand").
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1994).
220. Cf Lane, 518 U.S. at 197 (according significance to Congress's inclusion in Rehabilitation
Act of provision that specifically addressed remedies against federal defendants).
221. See id. at 197-200 (addressing plaintiffs argument that his reading of Sections 504(a) and
505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act was supported by Section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amend-
ments of 1986).
222. Id. at 198.
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1003(a)(2)'s authorization of remedies against states "to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or pri-
vate entity other than a State." 223 In Lane's view, the term "public ... entity" en-
compassed federal agencies and officials such as those from whom he sought
damages, and Section 1003(a)(2) established that money damages were equally
available from these "public" entities and "private" entities.
224
The Court rejected this argument. It determined that Section 1003(a)(2)
was "open to" interpretations that did not authorize money damages against the
federal government. 225 The Court observed that Section 1003(a)(2)'s separate
reference to "public" and "private" entities "suggests that there is a distinction
to be made in terms of the remedies available against the two classes of defen-
dants. '226 The Court reasoned that the distinction could be that money damages
were not available against "public" entities-such as the federal defendants sued
in Lane-whereas money damages were available against "private" entities.
227
Thus, the Court concluded that, assuming the term "public ... entity" referred to
the federal defendants, Section 1003(a)(2) was "susceptible of" an interpretation
that accorded with the Court's holding that money damages were not available
against those entities.
228
The Court suggested that Section 1003(a)(2) likewise plainly failed to
authorize money damages against states. The Court offered the following as a
plausible interpretation of that provision: "By reference to 'public or private en-
tit[ies],' Congress meant [in Section 1003(a)(2)] only to subject the States to the
scope of remedies available against either public or private [Section] 504 defen-
dants, whatever the lesser (or perhaps the greater) of those remedies might
be. ' '229 The "lesser" remedies meant only those remedies-not including money
damages-available against "public" entities such as the federal defendants in
Lane. Thus, the Court determined that Section 1003 could reasonably be con-
strued not to authorize money damages against the States, because such damages
were not among the "lesser" remedies available against the federal govern-
ment.230 That interpretation would bar an award of money damages against a
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) (1994).
224. Lane, 518 U.S. at 198 (describing Lane's argument as follows: "The 'public entities' to which
§ 1003 refers, Lane concludes, must include the federal Executive agencies named in § 504(a), and
those agencies must be subject to the same remedies under § 504(a), including monetary damages, as
are private entities.").
225. Id. at 199.
226. Id. at 199-200.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 199.
229. Id. (second emphasis added).
230. Section 1003(a)(2)'s authorization of remedies "at law" could be construed to allow money
damages, since that is the prototypical remedy available at law. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (describing compensatory damages as "classic form of legal relief"); see also Felt-
ner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1279, 1284 (1998) (monetary damages "generally
are thought to constitute legal relief"). The reference could also, however, plausibly be construed to
refer to nonmonetary, prospective relief, including mandamus, a type of relief that would not be avail-
able against private entities. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
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state for violations of Title V1.
23 1
The conclusion that Section 1003 does not authorize money damages is but-
tressed by the existence of federal statutes that specifically and unambiguously
do expose states to money damages. One example is the Copyright Remedy
Clarification Act of 1992.232 That statute not only abrogates eleventh amend-
ment immunity but also, in a separate section, authorizes recovery of "actual
damages."2 33 The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act is not the only example
of legislation that would satisfy the Court's remedy-specific clear statement
rule.234 The Court has considered these other statutes in determining whether
HARV. L. REV. 687, 696 (1990) (listing "historically legal" forms of relief as "ejectment, replevin,
mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus"); see generally LouIs L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACMION 192 (1965) (describing writ of prohibition); id. at 210-12 (describing history
of mandamus); id. at 193, 389-90 (discussing habeas corpus). Thus, the reference in Section 1003(a)(2)
to remedies "at law" does not undermine the Court's determination in Lane that Section 1003(a)(2)
can be read as not authorizing money damages against the States.
231. Although Lane strongly suggests that Section 1003 does not authorize money damages
against the State, the Court is not bound by that suggestion. The Court in Lane did not squarely ad-
dress the question whether Section 1003 authorizes such damages. Moreover, Lane's discussion of the
"lesser remedies" that Congress may have intended in Section 1003 to authorize against States was not
necessary to the Court's rejection of Lane's argument. The text supra discusses only one of the two
interpretations of Section 1003 that the Court in Lane found plausible and under which money dam-
ages would not be available against a federal executive agency for violations of Section 504(a) of the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court determined that another plausible interpretation was that Section
1003's reference to "public" entities referred only to "non-federal public entities receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance," such as "municipal hospitals" and "local school districts." Lane, 518 U.S. at 199.
Under this interpretation, Section 1003's reference to "public" entities did not refer to the federal gov-
ernment at all, and Section 1003 was therefore irrelevant to the issue before the Court. Having identi-
fied this interpretation as a plausible one, the Court did not need to posit any other plausible interpre-
tations of Section 1003 in order to reject Lane's argument under that provision. Although Lane does
not compel the Court to hold that monetary damages are unavailable under Section 1003, other con-
siderations, discussed in the text infra, support such a holding.
232. Pub. L. No. 101-553, § 2(a)(2), 104 Stat. 2749 (1990).
233. As amended, 17 U.S.C. § 511 (1994) provides (emphasis added):
(a) In General-Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune,
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other
doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any gov-
ernmental or nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copy-
right owner provided by sections 106 through 119, for importing copies of phonorecords in
violation of section 602, or for any other violation under this title.
(b) Remedies.-In a suit described in subsection (a) for a violation described in that subsec-
tion, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for the violation
to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against any
public or private entity other than a State, instrumentality of a State, or officer or employee
of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Such remedies include impounding and dispo-
sition of infringing articles under section 503, actual damages and profits and statutory dam-
ages under section 504, costs and attorney's fees under section 505, and the remedies pro-
vided in section 510.
234. See, e.g., Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992)
(codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994)) (providing that, in civil action, state entities "shall
be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongov-
ernmental entity") and 15 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (1994) (providing that remedies available against States
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Section 1003 was clear enough to expose the states to money damages. 235
While interpreting Section 1003 as a statute that does not authorize money
damages would reduce the statute's usefulness, it would not eliminate it. Under
such an interpretation, Section 1003 would still authorize prospective relief, such
as declaratory and injunctive relief, directly against the states. That relief would
otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.236 There are distinct advan-
tages to getting prospective relief directly against the State, instead of getting it
against state officers under the Ex parte Young doctrine. First, it ensures that
the court order will bind all of the officials necessary to provide the relief. That
is a significant benefit, because it is often difficult to identify (and sue) all of the
officials who possess the appropriate authority to provide the relief requested in
a lawsuit.
23 7
A recent example of a case that could have posed difficult remedial prob-
lems as an officer suit for prospective relief was Seminole Tribe.238 In that case,
include "actual damages"); 7 U.S.C. § 2570(b) (1994) (providing for recovery of "damages" from
States for violations of federal plant variety protection statutes); 17 U.S.C. § 2570(b) (1994) (author-
izing recovery of "actual damages" from States for violation of federal provisions protecting computer
chips); 25 U.S.C. § 941d(j) (1994) (authorizing cause of action "for money damages" by Native Ameri-
can tribe against State of South Carolina); 35 U.S.C. § 296(b) (1994) (patent provision authorizing suit
for "damages" against States); see also Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 718 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that, as amended in 1991, Title VII expressly abrogated States' eleventh amendment immu-
nity from "compensatory and punitive damages," 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994)); cf. 20 U.S.C. §
1403(b) (providing that, in action against states for violation of Americans with Disabilities Act,
"remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same
extent as those remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public entity other
than a State"); 20 U.S.C. § 7709(e)(3) (1994) (in action against state for violation of federal funding
statute, "[t]he court shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate"); 42 U.S.C. § 12202
(1994) (providing that, in action against state for violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, "reme-
dies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent
as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity
other than a State"); cf Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1980) (holding that certain fed-
eral environmental statutes abrogated eleventh amendment immunity from retroactive monetary
damages); id. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that statutes ab-
rogated Eleventh Amendment).
235. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 194-95, 200 (1996) (comparing provisions before Court that
were said to waive federal sovereign immunity to other statutory provisions waiving sovereign immu-
nity); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,34 (1992) (same).
236. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars all forms of federal court relief directly against State.
237. See, e.g., Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514-15 (1952) (rejecting former employee's suit
challenging his discharge from Veteran's Administration because no effective relief could be granted
as to only defendant properly before court). See generally James M. Hirschhorn, Where the Money Is:
Remedies to Finance Compliance with Strict Structural Injunctions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1851-74
(1984) (discussing Eleventh Amendment limitations on actions against state executive-branch officials
seeking relief that require funding by state legislature); see also Clark Byse, Proposed Reforms in Fed-
eral 'Nonstatutory' Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1479, 1493-99 (1962) (describing case law concerning "indispensable parties" in actions against
federal officers; concluding that it "causes confusion and wasteful litigation"); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 438-51 (1962)
(same).
238. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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the Seminole Tribe of Indians sued the Governor of Florida, as well as the State,
for failure to negotiate on a state-tribal compact governing gambling on a Native
American reservation located inside the State.239 The Court held that the suit
against the Governor did not fall within the Ex parte Young doctrine, because
Congress intended to preclude relief under that doctrine.240 If, contrary to that
holding, the suit against the Governor had been permitted and the Tribe had
prevailed, a question could have arisen whether the Governor could be required
to enter into a compact even if he lacked authority to do so under state law. 241
Second, obtaining relief directly against the State ensures that, if a court's reme-
dial order is violated, the plaintiff can seek monetary contempt sanctions payable
out of the state treasury. Such sanctions might otherwise be barred by sovereign
immunity.242 These advantages seem to defeat an argument that Section 1003
cannot plausibly be read to exclude money damages because such a reading
would render it useless.
243
More serious arguments against the interpretation of Section 1003 sug-
gested in Lane center on the issue of notice. One argument is that Congress
lacked notice in 1986 that Section 1003 would have to satisfy the Court's remedy-
specific clear statement rule, which developed primarily in cases decided after
1986.244 This argument is undermined to some extent by pre-1986 Supreme
Court decisions that rigorously applied the clear statement rule (though perhaps
with less rigor than later Court decisions). 245 Moreover, whatever the merits of
this argument, the Court has implicitly rejected it by applying an increasingly
239. Id. at 51.
240. Id. at 1132-33.
241. See id. at 1133 n.17 (citing case law from Kansas holding that its Governor could not enter
into compact without legislative approval); see also Monaghan, supra note 71, at 119 & n.131 (asserting
that federal statute under which Seminole Tribe sued "seemingly rearranges state lawmaking authority
by superseding the Florida state law that requires legislative approval of Indian tribe compacts").
242. See Hirschhorn, supra note 237, at 1861-65 (arguing that Supreme Court case law leaves un-
clear whether Eleventh Amendment bars civil contempt order requiring State to fund compliance with
federal-court order against state officials); see also Timothy J. Simeone, Rule 11 and Federal Sovereign
Immunity: Respecting the Explicit Waiver Requirement, 60 U. CHi. L. REv. 1043, 1052-58 (1993) (ar-
guing that sovereign immunity protects federal government from sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11);
Recent Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 965, 970 n.34 (1995) (noting that "[c]ourts have given uncertain and
varying indications on the applicability of sovereign immunity in the contempt context"; citing cases).
243. Cf. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 190, 196 (1996) (observing that government did not contest
propriety of injunctive relief); Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (observing that
statutes under which plaintiffs sued federal government would "be effective," even if construed not to
authorize retroactive monetary relief, because they "concededly authorize coercive sanctions");
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (observing that former Section 106(c),
"though not authorizing claims for monetary relief, would nevertheless perform a significant function"
by obviating sovereign-immunity objections to declaratory relief); Hoffman v. Connecticut Income
Maintenance Dep't, 492 U.S. 96,102 (1989) (explaining that former Section 106(c) "is more indicative
of declaratory.., relief than of monetary recovery" from states).
244. See John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules,
1995 Wis. L. REV. 771, 780 (1995) (arguing that Court's current, stringent version of clear statement
rule originated in 1991).
245. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(tracing use of clear-statement rule in Eleventh Amendment context to 1973).
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stringent clear statement rule to past enactments.
246
A second notice argument could be made in Hopwood. If the Hopwood de-
fendants made an argument based on the remedy-specific clear statement rule at
this point in the case, the plaintiffs could assert unfair surprise. Regardless,
there is no rule barring the courts from considering this new argument. The Su-
preme Court has made clear that an eleventh amendment defense can be raised
at any stage of a case. 247 Thus, the courts in Hopwood can address the new form
that the defendants' eleventh amendment argument would take.
248
The strongest argument against interpreting Section 1003 to preserve the
states' immunity from money damages would challenge the clear-statement rule
on which that interpretation rests. Indeed, the rule has generated much critical
commentary.249  At the same time, the commentators recognize that the
Hoffnan-Nordic Village approach is firmly established.250 The most cogent criti-
cism of the rule, in this author's view, is that it often defeats congressional in-
tent.251 For example, the legislative history of Section 1003 expresses an inten-
246. See id. at 257 (criticizing Court's rules for determining whether Congress has abrogated
Eleventh Amendment on ground that "[wihatever rule is decided upon at a given time is then applied
retroactively to actions taken by Congress").
247. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 n.1 (1978) (holding that defendants did not
waive Eleventh Amendment defense by failing to raise it in lower court); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 677-78 (1974) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1945)
(same).
248. Cf. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374,378-80 (1995) (holding that peti-
tioner in Supreme Court could advance argument in support of constitutional claim despite disavow-
ing that argument in court of appeals).
249. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 332 ("clear statement rule" applicable to purported
statutory abrogations of Eleventh Amendment "is unjustified in theory and is applied in an unduly
restrictive manner"); Nagle, supra note 244, at 773 (criticizing clear-statement rule on grounds that
"the Constitution does not entrust the judiciary with the responsibility for identifying which policy
values merit greatest protection, and interpretive rules that Congress cannot satisfy when drafting a
statute conflict with legislative supremacy"); id. at 799-800 & nn.132-34 (citing other commentary criti-
cizing Court's treatment of sovereign immunity); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
621-23, 629-45 (1992) (discussing Court's strict application of clear statement rule against congres-
sional abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 958-59 (1992) (suggesting clear statement rule may
exclude analysis by court which would lead to result implicit in statute); cf. George D. Brown, State
Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth:
Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 389-94 (1985)
(defending clear statement rule in Eleventh Amendment cases).
250. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 212 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that clear state-
ment rules "should be discarded"); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 39 (1992) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting) (arguing that clear statement rules should be "reexamine[d]"); Chemerinsky, supra
note 72, at 332 (stating, "[t]he rejection of state liability in Dellmuth and Hoffman, despite strong sup-
port for federal court jurisdiction in the statutes' text and legislative history, indicate that only a very
explicit, truly unmistakable statutory provision warrants state liability in federal court."); Meltzer, su-
pra note 63, at 29 (concluding that since 1990, "clear statement" rule that Court applies to purported
abrogations of Eleventh Amendment has been "enforced with undue strictness").
251. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 248-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing majority's application of clear statement rule caused it to ignore congressional intent);
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tion to make states liable in money damages. 252 Currently, however, the Court's
clear-statement precedents preclude reliance on legislative history for evidence
of Congress's intention to authorize money damages against a sovereign.253 This
categorical exclusion of that source of evidence is hard to justify.
2 54
In sum, Title VI provides a promising-but, in this author's view, ultimately
unavailing-basis for the claims for money damages in Hopwood. Prior litiga-
tion has established that the Hopwood defendants intentionally violated Title
VI, and, in the absence of eleventh amendment immunity, money damages
would be available for the violation. Furthermore, Section 1003 of the Rehabili-
tation Act Amendments of 1986 unequivocally expresses an intention to abro-
gate the states' eleventh amendment immunity from liability for such violations.
Under Supreme Court precedent, however, this is not enough to authorize
money damages. For that remedy to be available, a statutory abrogation "must
extend unambiguously to such monetary claims."2 55 The Court's opinion in Lane
v. Pena indicates that Section 1003 does not do so. For money damages to be re-
coverable under Title VI in cases like Hopwood, Congress must (and could)
amend the statute specifically and clearly to authorize such damages.256
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
210 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing how clear statement rule "might be challenged as an improper judicial
refusal to enforce ascertainable legislative intent").
252. See S. REP. NO. 99-388, at 28 (1986). The legislative history provides that:
[s]ection 1003 also explicitly provides that in a suit against a State for a violation of any of
these statutes, remedies, including monetary damages, are available to the same extent as
they would be available for such a violation in a suit against any public or private entity
other than a State.
Id. (emphasis added).
253. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (stating that, "the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of sov-
ereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text') (quoting United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1993))); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (stating that
evidence of congressional intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity "must be both unequivo-
cal and textual").
254. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that, "[a] genuine concern to
identify Congress' purpose would lead the Court to consider ... the statute's legislative history"); Na-
gle, supra note 244, at 828-29 (arguing that resort to legislative history may be necessary "to fulfill the
obligation to remain faithful to the immunity decision Congress made").
255. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.
256. If Section 1003 were construed to authorize monetary damages against the states for viola-
tions of Title VI, it would be necessary to decide whether Section 1003 falls within Congress's power to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)
(stating that inquiry into whether Congress has acted within its powers must be undertaken). Section
1003 seems to fall easily within Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, inso-
far as it authorizes money damages for Title VI violations. In City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,
2164 (1997), the Court held that legislation enacted under Section 5 must be "congruen[t]" with and
"proportiona[l]" to the Fourteenth Amendment violation Congress intends to prevent or remedy. To
the extent that Title VI proscribes only conduct that violates the Equal Protection Clause, see supra
note 166 and accompanying text, Section 1003's authorization of a remedy for that violation is per-
fectly "congruent" with the scope of the Clause. Cf Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 716-17
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Equal Pay Act fell within Section 5, even though proof of violation did
not require proof of intentional discrimination); Humenansky v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d
822, 827-28 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to abrogate states'
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5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Section 1988 permits courts to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to par-
ties who prevail in actions to enforce, among other provisions, Sections 1981,
1983, and Title VI. 257 Section 1988 is the only provision under which the Hop-
wood plaintiffs might recover some, albeit limited, monetary relief.
Although an award of attorney's fees is monetary relief, the Court has re-
treated from its early suggestion that such an award is authorized because Sec-
tion 1988 abrogates the eleventh amendment immunity. In Hutto v. Finney,
5 8
the Court suggested two reasons for rejecting an eleventh amendment challenge
to an award under Section 1988 that had been entered in a federal-court action
against a state official. First, Section 1988 was a valid exercise of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the state's
eleventh amendment immunity from retroactive monetary relief.25 9 Second, the
fee award did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment at all, because it was an-
cillary to "litigation seeking prospective relief' and thus came within the Ex
parte Young exception.260 In Missouri v. Jenkins,261 the Court embraced the sec-
ond rationale to the near-total exclusion of the first when it again upheld a fee
award against a state under Section 1988. The Court in Jenkins described Hutto
as holding that "an award of attorney's fees ancillary to prospective relief is not
subject to the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment. '262 Significantly, the Jen-
eleventh amendment immunity from actions for violations of Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding
that accommodation provisions of Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act exceeded
Congress's power under Section 5). Moreover, an award of monetary damages for the violation seems
"proportional" to the nature of the harm, because, "[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485
(1978) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)) (bracketed text sup-
plied by Court in Economou); cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992)
(determining remedies available for violation of Title VI in light of "traditional presumption" that
federal courts can award all appropriate remedies for violation of federal statute that gives rise to
cause of action). Interests in "liberty" are expressly protected by the Due Process Clause, rather than
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet it seems obvious that the interests
protected by Equal Protection Clause are entitled to as much congressional protection as are the lib-
erty interests protected by the Due Process Clause. See F7ores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163-64 (describing Con-
gress's power under Section 5 to enforce Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment by relying on
case law concerning Congress's power under Section 5 to enforce Equal Protection Clause).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
258. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
259. See id. at 693-94 (finding Congress "undoubtedly intended" in Section 1988 to exercise its
power under Section 5 to authorize retroactive relief against states "when their officials are sued in
their official capacities"). The Court in Hutto relied to a great extent on the legislative history of Sec-
tion 1988 in determining that Congress intended in that statute to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.
See id. at 694 & n.22 (discussing legislative history). In cases after Hutto, the Court held that the clear
statement rule cannot be satisfied by resort to legislative history. See supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
260. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694-95 (rejecting State's argument that Section 1988 did not express
with sufficient clarity an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment).
261. 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
262. Id. at 279; see also id. (describing fee award ancillary to litigation seeking only prospective
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kins Court did not repeat its suggestion in Hutto that Section 1988 abrogated
eleventh amendment immunity. Instead, the Court in Jenkins saw "no need ...
to determine whether Congress ha[d] spoken sufficiently clearly [in Section
1988] to meet a 'clear statement' requirement" for an abrogation.2 63 The Court
in Jenkins thus moved away from the abrogation rationale, presumably because
Section 1988 does not satisfy the stringent version of the clear statement that the
Court developed after Hutto.26 In so doing, the Court strongly suggested that
attorney's fees are recoverable under Section 1988 only because, and only to the
extent that, in contrast to money damages, they do not constitute retroactive
monetary relief.
Under Hutto and Jenkins, it is clear that the Hopwood plaintiffs can recover
some of their attorney's fees. If the appellate courts leave intact the district
court's final judgment awarding plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief, they
will be "prevailing parties" within the meaning of Section 1988.265 The fees they
incurred in obtaining that relief will be recoverable to the extent that they are
"reasonable." 266
It is doubtful, however, that the Hopwood plaintiffs will recover the fees
that they have incurred in asserting their claims for money damages. For one
thing, they should not prevail on those claims, because, as discussed, the claims
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment under current precedent.2 67 If the plain-
tiffs do prevail on their monetary claims, a court would have to decide whether
Section 1988 authorizes an award of fees incidental to the recovery of money
damages. The resolution of that issue depends on the continued vitality of the
Court's suggestion in Hutto that Section 1988 abrogates the states' eleventh
relief as "beyond the reach of the Eleventh Amendment"); id. (stating Hutto "made clear that the ap-
plication of § 1988 to the States did not depend on congressional abrogation of the States' immunity");
id. at 280 (stating, "The holding of Hutto, therefore, was not just that Congress had spoken sufficiently
clearly to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting § 1988, but rather that the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to an award of attorney's fees ancillary to a grant of prospective relief")
(emphasis added). The Court's move away from the abrogation rationale in Missouri v. Jenkins is
perhaps most clearly signaled by its use of the word "rather," instead of "also," in the foregoing pas-
sage.
263. Id. at 281.
264. See id. at 280 (asserting that, because holding in Hutto based on inapplicability of Eleventh
Amendment to fee award ancillary to prospective relief, "[tihat holding is unaffected by our subse-
quent jurisprudence concerning the degree of clarity with which Congress must speak in order to over-
ride Eleventh Amendment immunity"). As discussed supra note 72, by distancing itself from the ab-
rogation rationale suggested in Hutto, the Court in Jenkins also cast serious doubt on its suggestion in
Hutto that the "clear statement" rule is watered down for legislation enacted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
265. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109-14 (1992) (discussing meaning of "prevailing
party" for purposes of Section 1988).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see also Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114-16 (discussing reasonableness of fee
in light of merely technical victory); City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-67 (1992) (holding
that "reasonable" fee under Section 1988 does not include enhancement for contingency of recovery);
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92-102 (1991) (finding that "reasonable" fee
under Section 1988 does not include fees of expert witnesses).
267. See supra notes 109-256 and accompanying text for an analysis of claims for monetary dam-
ages in light of Eleventh Amendment.
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amendment immunity from retroactive monetary relief. That, in turn, is a matter
that the Supreme Court will have to decide.
268
IV. THE IRRATIONALITY OF SOVEREIGN AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Hopwood belies the notion that immunity is conservative-friendly, 269 be-
cause immunity here defeats claims that conservatives would traditionally sup-
port, namely, damages for victims of government-sponsored affirmative ac-
tion.270  Generally, Hopwood is not exceptional. In general, the immunity
doctrines operate largely without regard to the merits of the individual claims
that they defeat. Indeed, it is hard to identify any principled basis on which they
predictably operate.
First, consider only the immunity principles governing state and local gov-
ernment. Both state and local governments must comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment; for purposes of that Amendment, they are both state actors. 271 In
contrast, local governments are not state actors for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment.272 Thus, while a State can invoke the Eleventh Amendment when
sued in federal court for money damages caused by its violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a city or county cannot do so.
Second, consider the interaction of sovereign and official immunity. The
Court has often said that the states' sovereign immunity from suits in federal
courts is meant to avoid the "indignity" of haling one sovereign into the courts of
another.273 It seems, however, no less of an affront to the states to permit fed-
268. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(stating that "the Court of Appeals should... leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions").
269. See, e.g., Joseph F. Riga, State Immunity in Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 29, 30 (1997) (stating that "a resilient core of conservative Justices has been car-
rying on a 'love affair' with the concept of sovereign immunity, and, particularly, state sovereign im-
munity for many years"); see also Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Pen-
umbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1097-1106 (1997) (explaining that "conservative" majority of court has
issued recent decisions affirming sovereign immunity); Andrew I. Gavil, Interdisciplinary Aspects of
Seminole Tribe v. Florida: State Sovereign Immunity in the Context of Antitrust, Bankruptcy, Civil
Rights and Environmental Law, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1997) (predicting that "conserva-
tive wing" of Court may use sovereign immunity to restrict scope of Fourteenth Amendment in fu-
ture).
270. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and concurring in part) (arguing government can never dis-
criminate on basis of race and that "[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimi-
nation should be made whole"); see also June Kronholz, Politics & Policy: Education Agency Holds
Political Hot Potato by Involving Itself in Affirmative-Action Issue, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997, at A16
(describing "conservatives' ire" at federal investigation of Texas higher education in wake of Hop-
wood).
271. See supra note 106 and accompanying text for an explanation of local government's liability.
272. See supra note 105 and accompanying text for an explanation of Eleventh Amendment li-
ability.
273. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (plurality opinion) (stating
that Eleventh Amendment is designed to protect "dignity and respect afforded a State"); Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 ("The Eleventh Amendment ... serve[d] to avoid 'the indignity of subjecting a
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eral-court suits against their officials for injunctive relief that will control the de-
livery of state services and the structure of state government.274 Furthermore,
such injunctive relief may be just as offensive to the State as a retroactive mone-
tary award. Yet a federal court cannot enter the latter type of relief, even if it is
nominally against a state official. Thus, the "fiction" designed to preserve the
state's dignity goes only so far.275 Aside from state dignity, a suit against a state
official in his or her personal capacity faces the hurdle of official immunity.
276
While this type of immunity is designed to protect those entering public serv-
ice,277 it reflects little or no concern for the victims of unlawful government con-
duct.
Finally, consider the federal government's power to change existing immu-
nity law. The Supreme Court has indicated that official immunity is a common-
law, not a constitutional, doctrine.278 Consequently, either the federal courts or
Congress could modify and perhaps eliminate it. In contrast to official immu-
nity, the State's sovereign immunity is constitutional in nature and relatively
"immune" from revision short of amending the Constitution.279  The federal
courts cannot award money damages against an unconsenting State, even when
that State violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, on the other hand,
can authorize money damages in federal court against states when it exercises its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.280 To do so, however, Congress
must speak with crystalline clarity, the slightest ambiguity rendering its efforts
fruitless.
281
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' (quoting Puerto
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993))).
274. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (rejecting Eleventh Amendment chal-
lenge to court order requiring State to spend money to desegregate schools).
275. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 261 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion) (referring to Ex parte Young
doctrine as "fiction").
276. See supra notes 83-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of official immunity.
277. See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 118 S. Ct. 966, 972 (1998) (including among rationales for
absolute official immunity that "the threat of liability may significantly deter [public] service"); Har-
low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (citing distraction from duty as one rationale for qualified
official immunity).
278. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of common-law basis of offi-
cial immunity.
279. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Highways & Public Transp. Dept., 483 U.S. 468, 486 (stating that
Eleventh Amendment established "a broad constitutional principle of sovereign immunity"); Atasca-
dero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (stating that Eleventh Amendment preserved
"'constitutionally mandated balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government"
(quoting Garcia v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985))); Great Northern Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944) (stating Eleventh Amendment established the "constitutional right" of
states to be free from federal court actions).
280. See supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Congress, but not
courts, can abrogate Eleventh Amendment when enforcing Fourteenth Amendment.
281. See supra notes 194-214 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement of clear
statement for statute to authorize monetary relief against sovereign; see also Humenansky v. Regents
of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 824-25 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that, in express disagreement with
other circuits, Congress did not express sufficiently clear intention to abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity in Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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This scheme bespeaks a hierarchy of federal judicial solicitude, with the
greatest amount accorded to the States, somewhat less accorded to their officials,
and the least accorded to private individuals injured by illegal government con-
duct. The scheme puts the protection of the last group primarily in the hands of
Congress and state legislatures-which are dominated by majoritarian interests,
including state and local governments-rather than in the federal courts, which
were designed to protect individuals against those forces. Moreover, the existing
scheme makes the federal courts highly reluctant to believe that Congress has
acted to protect individuals at the expense of the States. In light of these fea-
tures, it would be hard to design a scheme that more effectively insulated itself
from change.
One can devise plausible justifications for the distinctions: (i) between state
and local governments;282 (ii) between suits against states and suits against their
officials; 283 (iii) between prospective and retrospective relief;284 (iv) between the
power of federal courts and that of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment;285 and (v) between Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and its power to enforce other constitutional provisions. 286 One can like-
wise justify the Court's use of clear-statement rules.287 But no one can pretend
that the immunity doctrines, as a whole, reflect coherent and just decision mak-
ing about when the government should pay for injuries caused by its unconstitu-
tional conduct.
288
Two scholars, Professors Jeffries and Monaghan, have recently argued that,
as a practical matter, the immunity doctrines seldom defeat meaningful relief for
282. See supra note 108 (citing commentary on differing treatment of state and local government
under Eleventh Amendment).
283. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of "stripping rationale" for
allowing suits against state officers notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment.
284. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (asserting that, whereas prospective remedies
"are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law," retrospective
remedies serve compensatory or deterrent interests that "are insufficient to overcome the dictates of
the Eleventh Amendment").
285. See supra note 150 (citing commentary on this issue).
286. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996) (stating, in contrast to
Article I powers, Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after Eleventh Amendment and "operated to
alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Elev-
enth Amendment").
287. See George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363, 389-94 (1985) (defending clear statement rule in Eleventh Amendment
cases). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 621-22, 632-46 (1992) (describing and
criticizing "clear statement" rules applied by Court in Eleventh Amendment and other areas).
288. See Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the
Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1297
(1994) (quoting scholarly descriptions of Eleventh Amendment law as chaotic); Calvin R. Massey,
State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 97 (1989) (observ-




injuries caused by wrongful state conduct. 28 9 This Article does not dispute either
scholar's position. It does, however, attempt to establish these two counter-
points. In response to Professor Jeffries' submission, the Article attempts to
show that the operation of the immunity doctrines diverts attention from, and
renders moot, the normative question of when the government should pay for
the damage that it causes. In response to Professor Monaghan's submission, the
Article illustrates that the immunity doctrines are so Byzantine that many meri-
torious claims will be defeated unless they are handled by specialists.
CONCLUSION
It is odd, but perhaps understandable, that affirmative-action scholars have
largely ignored the principles of sovereign and official immunity governing the
monetary claims in Hopwood. It is odd because those principles utterly defeat
the claims for money damages and greatly restrict the recovery of attorney's fees.
One would think these effects would at least have been noticed. It is nonetheless
perhaps understandable, for this reason-the immunity doctrines have grown so
complex and divorced from the merits of permitting monetary claims against the
government that they receive attention from only a small part of the legal com-
munity. It is hoped that this Article's analysis of Hopwood under current immu-
nity law will prompt a larger part of the community to consider the need for revi-
sion of that law.
289. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REv. 47, 49 (1998) (stating, "The Eleventh Amendment almost never matters"); Monaghan, supra
note 71, at 103 (referring to "the fundamental reality of state accountability in federal court for viola-
tion of federal law"). Professor Jeffries bases his argument in part on the admittedly "normative" con-
clusion about when the government should pay for the injuries that it has caused. Jeffries, supra, at 53;
see id. at 69 (arguing current law properly creates "a fault-based liability regime"). Professor Mona-
ghan bases his argument on the extent to which sovereign immunity is limited by Ex parte Young and
the state courts' presumed obligation under the Supremacy Clause to entertain actions for state viola-
tions of federal law. See Monaghan, supra note 71, at 122, 132; but cf. Richard H. Seamon, The Sover-
eign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts(unpublished manuscript on file with Brandeis Law Re-
view) (arguing that Tenth Amendment bars Congress from using Article I powers to force state courts
to hear private, federal actions against their own State).
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